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Memory, particularly memory for contextual details (i.e., recollection), 
undergoes significant development from middle childhood to young adulthood. This 
research examined the development of recollection utilizing participant’s subjective 
reports as well as their objective accuracy for two contextual details (i.e., the color of 
the item and a semantic judgment made during encoding). The aims of the present 
studies were to examine age-related differences in subjective and objective 
recollection, the correspondence between these abilities, and their neural correlates. 
Participants included 6- to 8-year-old children, 12- to 13-year-old adolescents, and 
young adults. Event-related potentials (ERPs) were recorded during the encoding 
(Study 1) and retrieval (Study 2) portions of a memory paradigm. Age-related 
improvements in objective and subjective recollection were found in both studies. At 
encoding, ERP indices of recollection were present when recollection was indexed 
subjectively or by accuracy for the semantic judgment made during encoding. In 
  
contrast, ERP responses were not sensitive to recollection when memory for color 
was used as the measure of recollection. ERP effects associated with recollection at 
encoding were not influenced by age. This finding suggests that children, adolescents, 
and adults process items similarly at the encoding stage. During retrieval, a 
recollection effect was only present when recollection was indexed by subjective 
judgments. Further, this effect was influenced by participant age. The effect was 
absent in children, topographically widespread in adolescents, and, consistent with 
previous literature (for review see Rugg & Curran, 2007), maximal over left centro-
parietal leads in adults. Collectively, these findings suggest that ERP effects 
associated with recollection may be more apparent using subjective versus objective 
measures and that improvement in memory performance from middle childhood to 
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Development of Subjective and Objective Recollection: 
Evidence from Event-Related Potentials 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
Remembering events from our past involves not only recognizing that specific 
events occurred but also retrieving contextual details about those experiences and 
subjectively reliving them. Research on the development of the subjective experience 
that accompanies recollection has lagged behind studies on the development of 
memory for specific contextual details. This has occurred primarily because of 
methodological challenges associated with administering subjective tasks to young 
children. However, investigations on the development of subjective remembering are 
important because this ability is a critical component of episodic memory (Tulving, 
1985). Further, the subjective experience of remembering is hypothesized to motivate 
action and support the development of self-identity by providing continuity of the self 
throughout the past, present, and future (Rajaram & Roediger, 1997). Thus, research 
on the development of subjective recollection will be able to shed light on multiple 
aspects of cognition including how and why children remember, memory phenomena 
observed across the lifespan (e.g., infantile and childhood amnesia), the emergence of 
self-recognition (Howe & Courage, 1997), and the construction of a personal timeline 
(Buckner & Carroll, 2007). The goal of this dissertation was to investigate the 
development of subjective and objective recollection using a developmental cognitive 
neuroscience framework. Specifically, the aims were to a) examine developmental 
differences in subjective and objective recollection, b) explore the correspondence 




responses (via event-related potentials) associated with subjective and objective 
recollection at encoding and retrieval.  
Two relatively separate bodies of literature served as the foundation for this 
investigation. The first includes the methods used to assess subjective and objective 
recollection in adults as well as the neural correlates of these abilities. The second 
includes studies on the development of subjective and objective recollection at the 
behavioral and neural levels of analysis.  This dissertation aims to bridge the gap 
between these literatures by providing critical information regarding the cognitive and 
neural development of subjective and objective recollection.  
Assessment of Recollection in Adults 
In order to study how people “relive” their experiences, Tulving (1985) 
developed the remember/know paradigm. During this procedure, participants encode 
a series of stimuli (e.g., pictures or words), and are asked at retrieval whether they 
“remember” the item or if they merely “know” they previously saw it. Participants are 
instructed to state that they “remember” an item when they can recollect contextual 
information associated with it (e.g., what they thought of or how they felt when they 
saw the item). For example, if a participant remembered that the picture of a dog was 
the first he saw or that the dog reminded him of the neighbor’s dog, he should provide 
a “remember” response. In contrast, if he was certain he saw the dog but could not 
recollect any contextual information associated with it, he should provide a “know” 
response.  
Verifying that participants understand the distinction between “remembering” 




mental states (Geraci, McCabe, & Guillory, 2009; Rajaram & Roediger, 1997). 
Researchers were initially concerned that participants may not be capable of 
introspecting about the contents of their memory or that they would interpret 
directions differently. However, these concerns have faded in studies of adults 
(Yonelinas, 2002), because of the consistency of results across studies and 
laboratories and convergence between the remember/know methodology and memory 
for specific contextual details (e.g., Dudukovic & Knowlton, 2006; Friedman & Trott, 
2000). For example of the relation between remember/know performance and 
memory for specific contextual details, one study showed that the list a word was 
studied from was more likely to be recollected for words given a “remember” 
judgment rather than those given a “know” judgment (Friedman & Trott, 2000). 
Another concern about the remember/know paradigm was that performance would 
reflect response confidence rather than differentiable states of memory. However, 
research has shown that remember/know judgments and confidence ratings are 
distinct constructs (as discussed by Yonelinas, 2002). For example, although amnesic 
patients perform similarly to controls in their provision of confidence ratings, they 
differ in their attribution of remember/know judgments (Rajaram, Hamilton, & 
Bolton, 2002). This work has collectively shown that adults do have conscious access 
to their memories and do use objectively recalled details in order to make subjective 
judgments of “remembering.”  
Others have built upon Tulving’s work by suggesting that performance on the 
remember/know paradigm reflects two independent memory states that underlie 




Recollection refers to memory for specific contextual details whereas familiarity 
refers to overall memory strength. For example, while taking a road trip you may first 
notice that your surroundings are familiar but be unable to remember having ever 
been there before. When you suddenly remember that you drove on this road on your 
way to a friend’s wedding on a hot day in July and that you were miserable because 
the air condition was broken, that is recollection.  
The processes of recollection and familiarity can be assessed in multiple ways. 
One method is to utilize subjective assessments of recollection and familiarity such as 
the remember/know paradigm (Tulving, 1985). Recollection is indexed by the 
proportion of “remember” responses because participants are asked to respond that 
they “remember” the item when it is retrieved along with contextual information. 
Because items given a “remember” judgment may also be familiar, familiarity cannot 
be directly indexed by the proportion of “know” responses (Yonelinas & Jacoby, 
1995).  In the example above, I was first capable of identifying that the road was 
familiar and then subsequently recollected when I was last on it, where I was going, 
and my emotional state during that trip. For this reason, familiarity is indexed by the 
proportion of “known” items relative to the number of previously viewed items that 
were not recollected (i.e., K/(1-R); Yonelinas & Jacoby, 1995).  In the subsequent 
text, “remember” responses are referred to a measure of subjective recollection. The 
benefit of using the remember/know paradigm to assess recollection is that any 





Recollection can also be indexed by accuracy for specific contextual details. 
Participants study items associated with contextual details and at retrieval are asked 
whether they have viewed the individual items before and, if so, which contextual 
detail was associated with them. For example, participants could study words that 
appear either at the top or bottom of the screen. At retrieval they would be asked 
whether they had seen the word before and, if so, where on the screen it appeared. 
Examples of details that have been utilized include color (i.e., was the item red or 
green?; e.g., Dudukovic & Knowlton, 2006), the gender of the person who originally 
spoke the word (i.e., was the word spoken by a male or female voice?; e.g., Wilding 
& Rugg, 1996), the question previously answered about the item (i.e., did you make a 
judgment about the item’s animacy or size?; e.g., Duarte, Ranganath, Winward, 
Hayward, & Knight, 2004), which list the word was a member of (i.e., was the word 
in List A or List B?;  e.g., Friedman & Trott, 2000), and which word was paired with 
it (i.e., was the word “apple” paired with the word “table”?; e.g., Donaldson & Rugg, 
1998). Accuracy for contextual details that can be objectively validated by the 
experimenters is subsequently referred to a measure of objective recollection.  
Two primary concerns have been raised about objective recollection tasks. 
First, given the forced-choice nature of the memory prompt, participants may be 
accurately guessing the contextual detail correctly as opposed to accurately 
recollecting the experience. Second, participants may recollect information about the 
item that is not associated with the contextual detail of interest (i.e., noncriterial 
recollection; Yonelinas & Jacoby, 1996). For example, the participant may have 




word “apple” was paired with the word “table.” Despite these limitations, the benefit 
of objective recollection paradigms is that performance is not dependent upon 
subjective memory judgments. 
Neural Correlates of Recollection in Adults 
The neural correlates of subjective and objective recollection have been 
examined in adults using several methodological approaches, including 
neuropsychological investigations of lesion patients, ERPs, and functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI). Studies of patients with brain lesions suggest that whereas 
hippocampal lesions influence performance on both subjective and objective 
recollection (for review see Yonelinas, 2002), lesions to the prefrontal cortex (PFC) 
are specifically detrimental to the recollection of objective details (Duarte, 
Ranganath, & Knight, 2005; Kopelman, Stanhope, & Kingsley, 1997; Swick, 
Senkfor, & Van Petten, 2006). Duarte and colleagues (2005) argued that the PFC may 
be specifically recruited during objective assessments of recollection due to the 
processing demands of those tasks. Although a subjective assessment of an item as 
“remembered” may arise when any contextual detail is retrieved, performance on the 
objective assessment requires the retrieval of a specific contextual detail. The ability 
to recollect specific contextual details requires strategic search, maintenance, and 
evaluation of information acquired from the medial temporal regions, functions 
hypothesized to be carried out by the PFC (Dobbins & Han, 2006; Fletcher & 
Henson, 2001; Simons & Spiers, 2003).  ERP and fMRI studies have examined neural 
activity associated with recollection and familiarity at encoding, when information is 




subjective and objective recollection rely on partially overlapping yet dissociable 
neural networks, underscoring the importance of assessing both subjective and 
objective measures of recollection.  
Encoding. ERP methodology has shown that, at encoding, components of the 
ERP waveform are sensitive to subjective but not objective recollection. Encoding 
studies have shown that neural activity differentiates performance on Tulving’s 
(1985) remember/know paradigm.  Items that are subsequently given a  “remember” 
judgment elicit a more positive-going waveform in comparison to items given a 
“know” judgment during the 400-1000 ms epoch (Duarte et al., 2004; Friedman & 
Trott, 2000; Mangels, Picton, & Craik, 2001; Yovel & Paller, 2004; c.f. Smith, 1993). 
Further, amplitude elicited to “remembered” items differs from the amplitude elicited 
to “missed” items, whereas the amplitude to “known” items does not. In contrast, 
ERPs at encoding do not differentiate whether participants accurately identify 
objective contextual details associated with items or not (Duarte et al., 2004; 
Friedman & Trott, 2000; Guo, Duan, Li, & Paller, 2006; Rollins & Riggins, 2013). 
The best evidence for this dissociation comes from a study that used a within-subjects 
design (Friedman & Trott, 2000). Friedman and Trott (2000) reported differences in 
ERP amplitude between items subsequently given “remember” and “know” 
judgments but not between items for which the list membership was or was not 
recollected. These findings suggest that subjective and objective recollection may be 
neurally dissociable constructs at the encoding phase.  
fMRI studies of encoding have shown that subsequently recollected items 




compared to items that are given a “know” judgment or identified without objective 
contextual details (Achim & Lepage, 2005; Brewer, Zhao, Desmond, Glover, & 
Gabrieli, 1998; Cansino, Maquet, Dolan, & Rugg, 2002; Chua, Rand-Giovannetti, 
Schacter, Albert, & Sperling, 2004; Henson, Rugg, Shallice, Josephs, & Dolan, 1999; 
Uncapher, Otten, & Rugg, 2006). Too few studies of memory encoding have been 
conducted to directly compare neural regions involved in subjective and objective 
recollection, and, to my knowledge, no investigations have included both measures of 
objective and subjective recollection in the same study. 
Retrieval.  Studies using ERPs to examine memory retrieval have 
demonstrated reliable recollection effects (i.e., neural activity that differentiates 
recollected from familiar items) for subjective and objective assessments (for reviews 
see Friedman & Johnson, 2000; Rugg & Curran, 2007). Consistent with dual process 
models of memory, which propose that familiarity and recollection are dissociable 
processes that rely on different brain networks (e.g., Yonelinas, 2002), the processes 
of recollection and familiarity have been related to distinct components of the ERP 
waveform at retrieval. Familiarity is associated with the mid-frontal old/new effect 
which occurs 300-500 ms poststimulus onset (Curran, 2000; Rugg et al., 1998; Trott, 
Friedman, Ritter, Fabiani, & Snodgrass, 1999; Woodruff, Hayama, & Rugg, 2006). 
This activity distinguishes “old” from “new” items but does not differentiate 
“remembered” and “known” items (Rugg et al., 1998; Trott et al., 1999). In contrast, 
recollection is associated with the left parietal old/new effect which occurs 400-800 
ms poststimulus onset (for reviews see Friedman & Johnson, 2000; Rugg & Curran, 




response to familiar items. This pattern of results has been shown using both 
subjective and objective paradigms. However, consistent with ERP studies of 
encoding, the magnitude of the parietal old/new effect at retrieval is larger using the 
subjective remember/know paradigm versus a measure of objective recollection (e.g., 
Trott et al., 1999). Differences in the magnitude of the effect may reflect differences 
in the degree to which neural regions or networks that underlie this response are 
involved in subjective and objective recollection. 
 fMRI methodology has confirmed evidence by ERP studies which suggested 
partially overlapping yet dissociable neural involvement in subjective and objective 
recollection at retrieval. A recent meta-analysis suggests that at retrieval the regions 
involved in subjective and objective recollection, although partially overlapping, are 
dissociable (Spaniol et al., 2009). Studies of objective recollection were more likely 
to recruit the ventrolateral PFC, dorsolateral PFC, anterior cingulate cortex, and 
intraparietal sulcus. In contrast, studies of subjective recollection were more likely to 
recruit the medial anterior PFC, inferior parietal cortex, parahippocampal gyrus, and 
hippocampus. 
Conclusions.  Collectively, studies in lesion patients and investigations using 
ERP and fMRI methodologies suggest that although objective and subjective 
recollection are related constructs, they recruit partially dissociable neural networks. 
It is currently unclear whether this difference is primarily due to methodological 
differences across paradigms, differences in the neural substrates that underlie 
subjective and objective recollection, differences in other cognitive processes that 




the PFC), or a combination of these factors. These findings highlight the importance 
of examining both objective and subjective recollection. Developmental research may 
be able to shed light on the relations between subjective and objective recollection 
and their neural correlates. 
Assessment of Recollection in Developmental Populations 
Developmental studies of memory are important because they can inform 
knowledge about the constructs of recollection and familiarity, including the neural 
mechanisms that underlie these abilities and the cognitive operations that support 
them. For example, whether the PFC is differentially involved in subjective and 
objective recollection may be a question with particular utility for a developmental 
approach given the prolonged developmental trajectory of this neural region (Gogtay 
et al., 2004).  Relative to the body of literature in adults on recollection and 
familiarity, substantially fewer studies have been conducted in developmental 
populations.  Of the research that does exist, most developmental studies have 
examined objective recollection due to concerns about children’s ability to perform 
introspective tasks (see Appendix A for a review of the development of 
metacognition with a focus on metamemory; Cycowicz, 2000; Cycowicz, Friedman, 
& Duff, 2003; Cycowicz, Friedman, & Snodgrass, 2001; Czernochowski, 
Mecklinger, Johansson, & Brinkmann, 2005; Drummey & Newcombe, 2002; Lloyd, 
Doydum, & Newcombe, 2009; Riggins, Rollins, & Graham, 2013; Rollins & Riggins, 
2013; Sluzenski, Newcombe, & Kovacs, 2006).  Only a few developmental studies 
have been conducted using subjective methods similar to those in adults, such as the 




Chastelaine, Nessler, & Malcolm, 2010; Ghetti, Mirandola, Angelini, Cornoldi, & 
Ciaramelli, 2011; Hembacher & Ghetti, 2013; Ofen et al., 2007; Piolino et al., 2007) 
and the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) procedure (Ghetti & Angelini, 2008). 
Collectively, developmental studies of subjective and objective recollection suggest 
that recollection follows a prolonged developmental trajectory into adolescence, 
whereas familiarity develops by middle childhood and remains relatively stable.  
An intensive behavioral investigation of subjective and objective recollection 
was recently conducted by Ghetti and colleagues (2011) with the following age 
groups: 6-7-year-olds, 9-10-year-olds, 12-13-year-olds, and 17-18-year-olds. This 
study will be described in detail because the design is similar to that of the current 
studies. Participant understanding of subjective memory states was assessed by the 
ability to classify statements as meeting the criteria for a “remember” or “familiar” 
judgment (i.e., the term “know” was changed to “familiar” to improve the youngest 
participants’ understanding of the distinction). For example, the statement “I know I 
saw a giraffe because it was red” should be given a “remember” judgment whereas “I 
know I saw a stapler but I can’t remember what question I answered about it” should 
be given a “familiar” judgment. Age-related improvements were present in the ability 
to classify statements; however, even 6- to 7-year-old participants were able to 
reliably classify statements.  
Participants also performed a memory task that allowed for the examination of 
relations among old/new confidence ratings, subjective recollection, and objective 
recollection (Ghetti et al., 2011). Subjective recollection was indexed by 




the item’s original color and the semantic judgment made at encoding. Data on the 
memory task further supported that even young children understand subjective 
memory states. Across age groups, items that were given a “remember” judgment 
were judged as more confidently recognized and were more likely to be associated 
with accurate objective details (i.e., color and semantic judgment) than items given a 
“familiar” judgment. However, with age the difference in confidence ratings and 
objective accuracy between items given “remember” and “familiar” judgments 
increased. Findings from both the classification and memory tasks suggest that 
children as young as 6 years of age can reliably perform subjective recollection tasks, 
although age-related improvements are present. This was an important finding 
because of previous concerns about children’s ability to perform subjective 
recollection tasks (e.g., Brainerd, Holliday, & Reyna, 2004; Brainerd, Payne, Wright, 
& Reyna, 2003; Ghetti, Qin, & Goodman, 2002).  
Neural Correlates of Recollection in Developmental Populations 
Developmental studies have contributed substantially to our knowledge about 
the neural mechanisms that underlie recollection. Studies of both encoding and 
retrieval are reviewed because improvements in memory performance may be due to 
the development of encoding processes, retrieval processes, or both.  ERP 
methodology has demonstrated developmental differences in the timing, direction, 
and topography of memory effects at encoding and retrieval and that age-related 
differences may be present in the recruitment of familiarity and recollection. All 
developmental ERP studies have either used recognition or objective recollection 




fMRI studies using subjective and objective recollection paradigms have shown age-
related differences in the recruitment and specificity of neural regions involved in 
recollection.  
Encoding. One developmental study has used the ERP methodology to 
examine encoding processes (Rollins & Riggins, 2013). This study found that the 
timing, direction, and topography of subsequent recognition effects differed between 
6-year-old children and adults. However, consistent with adult studies reviewed 
above (Duarte et al., 2004; Friedman & Trott, 2000; Guo et al., 2006), ERP effects 
did not differentiate items subsequently recollected along with an objective detail in 
either children or adults. 
Developmental fMRI studies suggest that neural regions supporting 
recollection undergo substantial age-related differences by becoming more specific 
for recollection-based processing. To date, two developmental fMRI studies of 
memory encoding have utilized objective recollection paradigms (Ghetti, DeMaster, 
Yonelinas, & Bunge, 2010; Güler & Thomas, 2013), and one has employed a 
subjective recollection paradigm (i.e., the remember/know paradigm, Ofen et al., 
2007). Studies using objective paradigms have suggested age-related differences in 
the activation of medial temporal and prefrontal cortices. The activation of the 
hippocampus during encoding becomes increasingly specialized for recollection with 
age (Ghetti et al., 2010). The hippocampal activation of 8-year-olds did not 
differentiate items later recalled with and without contextual details; in contrast, 
hippocampal activation of 14-year-olds and adults was larger for items subsequently 




contextual detail of color and subsequently forgotten items (Ghetti et al., 2010). 
Another study using an objective recollection paradigm revealed increased encoding 
efficiency with age in PFC regions (Güler & Thomas, 2013).  Güler & Thomas 
(2013) reported that 8-year-old children recruited regions of the DLPFC and temporal 
cortex in order to remember word pairs that 12-13-year-olds did not.  This finding is 
interesting because Ofen and colleagues (2007), who used a subjective recollection 
paradigm, reported that the recruitment of the DLPFC for “remembered,” in 
comparison to “familiar” items, increased with age. Taken together, these findings 
suggest development of the neural regions that support encoding processes during 
middle to late childhood. 
Retrieval.  Multiple ERP studies of memory retrieval have examined the 
development of objective recollection during middle childhood (Cycowicz et al., 
2003; Czernochowski, Mecklinger, & Johansson, 2009; Czernochowski et al., 2005; 
Mecklinger, Brunnemann, & Kipp, 2011; Sprondel, Kipp, & Mecklinger, 2011, 
2012). All studies reveal that the processes that support memory performance change 
with age. However, research findings on the developmental progression of 
recollection and the relative contributions of recollection and familiarity to memory 
performance differ.  One study suggested that ERP effects associated with 
recollection demonstrate a prolonged developmental trajectory (Cycowicz et al., 
2003). Using an objective recollection task, this study found that adults, but not 
children or adolescents, demonstrated a reliable parietal old/new effect (i.e., the 
putative ERP correlate of recollection). In contrast, other studies have found that 




frontal effect that has been associated with familiarity (Czernochowski et al., 2005; 
Friedman et al., 2010; Sprondel et al., 2011).  Because of this pattern of findings, 
some researchers have suggested that children predominantly rely on recollection 
rather than familiarity (Czernochowski et al., 2005; Friedman et al., 2010). This is 
puzzling because it stands in opposition to behavioral data suggesting a smaller age-
related change in familiarity than recollection (Ghetti & Angelini, 2008). This 
discrepancy across studies may be due to multiple factors, including methodological 
differences. Lastly, one study showed that children and adults both utilize the 
processes of familiarity and recollection, however, do so differentially based on task 
demands (Mecklinger et al., 2011). When timing demands were imposed during a 
recollection task, both children and adults demonstrated the frontal old/new effect 
(i.e., the ERP correlate of familiarity) whereas neither group demonstrated the parietal 
old/new effect associated with recollection. When timing demands were not present, 
only adults showed the frontal old/new effect and both children and adults showed the 
parietal old/new effect.  Taken together, these studies raise more questions than they 
answer. Full understanding of the development of recollection will require studies, 
such as the present dissertation, that utilize methodologies more widely employed in 
the adult literature on recollection.  
Two developmental fMRI studies have examined retrieval processes 
associated with objective recollection (DeMaster & Ghetti, 2013; Güler & Thomas, 
2013).  One study revealed age-related differences in the recruitment of the 
hippocampus, parietal cortex, and prefrontal cortex (DeMaster & Ghetti, 2013). 




hippocampus to successfully recollect item color, adults recruited the anterior regions. 
In adults, the posterior parietal cortex was sensitive to item recognition (i.e., the 
activation was larger for items recognized either with or without the border color 
correct compared to novel items). Activation in children was larger for items 
recollected with the color correct than the color incorrect and novel items. Lastly, left 
anterior PFC in adults, but not children, was sensitive to memory.  Similarly, Güler 
and Thomas (2013) found that neural activity was greater for recalled than forgotten 
information in medial temporal, parietal, and frontal cortices in 12- and 13-year-old 
but not 8- to 9-year-old children.  Because prefrontal and parietal cortices are 
commonly recruited during successful objective recollection tasks in adults (Spaniol 
et al., 2009), this age-related difference may underlie children’s poorer performance 
on objective recollection tasks. 
Conclusions.  In summary, ERP and fMRI studies have demonstrated that the 
timing of recollective processes and the neural regions that support them demonstrate 
substantial change from middle childhood through adolescence. However, a number 
of gaps are present in the current literature. No developmental study has examined the 
development of subjective recollection at either encoding or retrieval using ERPs, and 
no fMRI study has examined the development of subjective recollection at retrieval. 
Furthermore, no studies have assessed the development of objective and subjective 
recollection using a within-subject design at encoding or retrieval using either ERP or 
fMRI methodologies.  These gaps are problematic because of the importance of 
memory capacities and evidence suggesting that objective and subjective recollection 




fill a substantial gap in the current literature by investigating ERP responses 
associated with subjective and objective recollection at encoding and retrieval in 
children, adolescents, and adults. 
The Present Study 
The aims of the present studies were to 1) examine the behavioral 
development of subjective and objective recollection, 2) explore age-related 
differences in the correspondence between subjective and objective recollection, and 
3) evaluate neural responses associated with subjective and objective recollection at 
encoding and retrieval (see Table 1 for a summary of the aims, hypotheses, and 
research questions). To achieve this goal, ERPs were recorded as children, 
adolescents, and adults performed encoding (Study 1) and retrieval (Study 2) phases 
of a memory paradigm. Participants made color and semantic judgments about each 
item at encoding. At retrieval participants made recognition (i.e., old/new), subjective 
recollection (i.e., remember/familiar), and objective recollection judgments for each 
item (i.e., color and semantic judgments; for a similar design see Ghetti et al., 2011). 
Understanding of the subjective recollection judgments was examined using a 






Aims, Hypotheses, and Research Questions  
 
Hypotheses/Research Questions 
 Supported/ Not 
Supported 
Aim 1: Examine developmental differences in subjective 
and objective recollection 
  
 Study 1: Encoding   
 H1a: Reports of subjective remembering associated 
with accurately recognized items will decrease 
with age (i.e., because adults will use the 
“remember” judgment more selectively). 
 Not Supported 
 H1b: Reports of subjective remembering associated 
with falsely recognized items will decrease with 
age. 
 Supported 
 H1c: All age groups will be able to classify statements 
as meeting the criteria for a “remember” or 
“familiar” judgment above chance levels. 
 Supported 
 H1d: Participants will more accurately classify 
statements as meeting the criteria for a 
“remember” or “familiar” judgment with age. 
 Supported 
 H1e: Memory for the original color of the item will 
improve with age. 
 Supported 
 H1f: Memory for the semantic judgment made at 
encoding will improve with age. 
 Supported 
 Study 2: Retrieval   
 H1g: Reports of subjective remembering associated 
with accurately recognized items will decrease 
with age. 
 Not Supported 
 H1h: Reports of subjective remembering associated 
with falsely recognized items will decrease with 
age. 
 Not Supported 
 H1i: All age groups will be able to classify statements 
as meeting the criteria for a “remember” or 
“familiar” judgment above chance levels. 
 Supported 
 H1j: Participants will more accurately classify 
statements as meeting the criteria for a 
“remember” or “familiar” judgment with age. 
 Supported 
 H1k: Memory for the original color of the item will 
improve with age. 
 Not Supported 
 H1l: Memory for the semantic judgment made at 










Table 1 Continued 
 
Hypotheses/Research Questions 
 Supported/ Not 
Supported 
 
Aim 2: Explore the correspondence between subjective 
and objective measures of recollection 
   
 Study 1: Encoding    
 H2a: With age, accurate memory for objective 
details will increasingly be associated with 
“remember” rather than “familiar” judgments. 
 Not Supported  
 Study 2: Retrieval    
 H2b: With age, accurate memory for objective 
details will increasingly be associated with 
“remember” rather than “familiar” judgments. 
 Supported  
Aim 3: Evaluate ERP responses of subjective and 
objective recollection during memory encoding and 
retrieval. 
  
 Study 1: Encoding   
 H3a: ERP amplitude elicited to items subsequently 
given a “remember” judgment will be more 
positive than the amplitude to “familiar” and 
missed items (i.e., Remembered > Familiar = 
Missed).  
 Supported 
 700-900 ms  
 RQ1: Will age-related differences be present in the 
timing, topography, and/or direction of this 
effect?  
 No 
 H3b: ERP amplitude elicited to subsequently 
recognized items will be greater than missed 
items but similar regardless of whether the 
original item color is recollected or not (i.e., 
Color-correct = Color-incorrect > Missed).  
 Not Supported 
700-900 ms 
C-C > M  
 H3c: ERP amplitude elicited to subsequently 
recognized items will be greater than missed 
items but similar regardless of whether the 
semantic judgment made at encoding is 
recollected or not (i.e., Task-correct = Task-
incorrect > Missed). 
 Not Supported 
700-900 ms 
 T-C > T-I = M 
   (continued) 





Table 1 Continued 
 




 Supported/ Not 
Supported 
 Study 2: Retrieval   
 H3d: ERP amplitude will be more positive for items 
given a “remember” judgment than items given a 
“familiar” judgment and correctly rejected novel 




 RQ2: Will age-related differences be present in the 
timing, topography, and/or direction of this 
effect?  
 Yes, presence and 
topography 
 H3e: ERP amplitude will be more positive to items 
recollected along with the contextual detail of 
color relative to recognized items for which that 
details is forgotten and correctly rejected novel 
items (i.e., Color-correct > Color-incorrect = 
Correct rejections). 
 Not Supported 
 
 RQ3: Will age-related differences be present in the 
timing, topography, and/or direction of this 
effect? 
 N/A 
 H3f: ERP amplitude will be more positive to items 
recollected along with the semantic judgment 
made at encoding  relative to recognized items 
for which that detail is forgotten and correctly 
rejected novel items (i.e., Task-correct > Task-
incorrect = Correct rejections). 
 Not Supported 
 RQ4: Will age-related differences be present in the 






Chapter 2: Study 1 
Method 
Participants.  A total of 124 participants provided complete behavioral data 
for this study, 55 children (mean age = 7.63 years, SD = .75, 32 females, 23 males), 
32 adolescents (mean age = 12.79 years, SD = .61, 18 females, 14 males), and 37 
adults (mean age = 20.221 years, SD = 2.26, 20 females, 17 males).  An additional 9 
participants came in for the study but were excluded due to noncompliance (1 child) 
or equipment failure (2 children, 6 adults). Two participants (1 child, 1 adolescent) 
were excluded from subjective recollection analyses because they verbally indicated 
using the judgments incorrectly (i.e., both believed they should only use the 
“remember” judgment when both contextual details were recalled). Three participants 
(1 child, 1 adolescent, 1 adult) were excluded from the analysis examining the 
correspondence between objective and subjective recollection because they provided 
exclusively “remember” or “familiar” judgments for all recognized stimuli. 
Materials. 
Pictorial stimuli.  Stimuli included 194 images of items that could be 
classified as living/non-living and big/small (i.e., of animals, plants, and common 
objects). The images came from a colored version of the Snodgrass and Vanderwart 
line drawings (Rossion & Pourtois, 2004) and external sources. Images obtained from 
external sources were matched for object complexity with the Rossion and Pourtois 
(2004) images. Fourteen images were used as practice stimuli to ensure participants 
understood the task. The remaining 180 images were used as test stimuli.  Participants 
                                                 
1 Two adult participants did not provide their exact birthdate. However, they fell within the range of 




saw 120 of the test stimuli at encoding and all 180 stimuli at retrieval. To ensure that 
stimulus characteristics did not influence memory performance, the stimuli were 
sorted into three sets of 60 pictures. Each set included 15 stimuli in each of the 
following categories which were relevant for the task (see memory paradigm 
procedure below): large/living, large/non-living, small/living, and small/non-living. 
Once sorted into sets, the images were altered to be shades of red or green for the 
encoding phase and gray for the retrieval phase using Microsoft Powerpoint software. 
Coloration was approximately distributed across the four categories. For the stimuli 
that are typically red (e.g., lobster) or green (e.g., alligator), half of them remained 
their typical color and the other half were changed to the atypical color. For each set 
of pictures, 30 were red and 30 were green. See Appendix B for examples of four 
stimuli. 
Classification task. The classification task examined participant 
understanding of the distinction between the subjective memory terms “remember” 
and “familiar” (Tulving, 1985). This task was modeled after the assessment used by 
Ghetti and colleagues (2011; see Appendix C for the script and body of the 
classification task). Participants classified 36 subjective memory statements (18 
remember, 18 familiar). Six “remember” statements were associated with memory for 
each of the following: color, the semantic judgment made, and memory for both the 
color and semantic judgment (e.g., “I saw sunglasses, I can picture them in red and I 
said they were not living”). Six “familiar” statements were associated with the 
absence of memory for color, the semantic judgment, and memory for both the color 




green”). To ensure participants were not relying on confidence to distinguish 
subjective recollection states, 12 of the statements were high in confidence (6 
remember, 6 familiar; e.g., “I definitely saw a panther but I can’t tell you what 
question you asked me.”). Each of the stimulus categories described above (e.g., 
living/big) were represented in 9 statements. To decrease the likelihood that 
participants could confuse the statements from the classification task with the 
memory task, the stimuli used in the memory and classifications task did not overlap. 
Procedures. The University of Maryland Institutional Review Board 
approved all procedures prior to the beginning of the study (see Appendix D for the 
approval letters). Child and adolescent participants were recruited from a database 
maintained by the Infant and Child Studies Consortium at the University of 
Maryland, College Park or by announcements sent to local parent groups. Child 
participants received a small gift for participating and adolescents received either a 
small gift or $10. Adult participants were recruited from the Psychology 
Department’s electronic database used to provide students with course credit for 
participation.  Informed assent/consent and parental consent, when applicable, was 
obtained at the beginning of each session. 
Memory paradigm. The present study was modeled after previous ERP 
studies of encoding processes in children (Rollins & Riggins, 2013) and adults (e.g., 
Duarte et al., 2004) as well as Ghetti and colleagues’ (2011) behavioral study on the 
development of  subjective and objective recollection. 
First, participants were fitted with a stretchy Lycra cap appropriate for their 




of a computer screen in a dimly lit room. During encoding, participants made 
judgments about the color and a semantic feature (i.e., animacy or size) of each 
stimulus. Participants performed a practice phase to ensure they were able to 
distinguish the color of the object and accurately make the semantic judgments. All 
participants were asked to first report the stimulus color followed by the semantic 
judgment. During practice, the experimenter gave feedback if these judgments were 
made inaccurately. Participants were instructed to only provide their verbal responses 
after the stimulus went off of the screen to avoid the inclusion of movement artifact 
during the recording epoch. The experimenter recorded all participants’ verbal 
responses via a button press. This procedure was used to decrease movement artifact 
typically associated with a button press, particularly for the youngest age group 
(DeBoer, Scott, & Nelson, 2007). 
 During encoding, participants were aware their memory would be 
subsequently examined. However, they did not know they would be subsequently 
asked to make subjective or objective recollection judgments. ERPs and behavioral 
responses were collected during the encoding portion of the study, and behavioral 
responses were recorded during the retrieval portion. Participants’ semantic 
judgments about animacy and size were alternated in blocks of 30 stimuli (i.e., 
ABAB) to decrease executive function demands associated with switching (see 
Rollins & Riggins, 2013, and Ghetti et al., 2011, for similar arguments). Four, rather 
than two, encoding blocks were selected to decrease the chance that participants 
could rely on familiarity when making subsequent recollective judgments about the 




The semantic judgment made first and the stimulus sets that were associated with 
each encoding block were counterbalanced across participants. The presentation of 
individual stimuli within sets was randomly selected by E-Prime presentation 
software. A fixation cross was displayed on a white background for an inter-trial 
interval of 500 ms. Stimuli were presented for 1500 ms on a white background. Then, 
questions were presented on the screen and remained until the participants made a 
response (e.g., Red/Green?). If participants were unable to answer these questions 
because they failed to see a stimulus (i.e., they closed their eyes or looked away from 
the screen during stimulus presentation), that stimulus was excluded from behavioral 
and electrophysiological analysis. Between blocks the experimenter reminded 
participants about the judgments they would be making and that they would 
subsequently complete a memory task.  
 After encoding, participants were given a break of approximately 10 minutes 
during which time the Lycra cap was removed. Following the break, participants 
began the practice of the retrieval phase. The experimenter told participants they 
would see the same stimuli as before as well as new stimuli and that all of the images 
would be in grayscale. For each stimulus, participants made a recognition judgment 
(i.e., old/new), and, if they said the stimulus was “old,” they were asked questions to 
assess recollection. First, they were asked to subjectively determine if they 
“remembered” the stimulus or whether it was “familiar.” The experimenter explained 
the remember/familiar distinction to the participants. The instructions were similar to 




“You should say you remember the drawing if you can think of when you first 
saw it.  If you can think of specific details about when you saw the drawing 
before, then you remember it. For example, you should say remember it if you 
can clearly picture the color the picture was, the question you answered about 
it, or something else that you thought of when I showed it to you. However, 
sometimes you will feel like you have seen the drawing before, but you won’t 
be able to think of the first time you saw it.  You can’t come up with details, 
but you know you’ve seen it.  If you know you’ve seen the drawing before but 
you can’t come up with any details, you should say the drawing is familiar.   
You can be very sure you saw the drawing, but, if you can’t come up with any 
details, it’s still familiar.”  
To verify understanding, the researcher asked participants to define the terms 
“remember” and “familiar.” Additional instruction and feedback were provided if 
participants showed a lack of understanding. Last, participants were told that they 
would be asked the original color of the stimulus and to state which semantic 
judgment (i.e., animacy or size) was made for that stimulus at encoding. Participants 
were shown nine practice stimuli (six were seen during encoding practice and three 
were novel). During the practice, participants were provided feedback about the 
accuracy of their responses.  
During the test phase, participants viewed the grayscale version of the 120 
stimuli previously viewed at encoding and 60 novel stimuli. Stimuli were presented in 
a random order. A 500 ms fixation cross was presented between each stimulus. Each 




judgment. If the participant responded that the item was “old,” a subjective 
recollection judgment and the two objective recollection judgments were made for 
that item. For each of these judgments, a written prompt was provided to remind the 
participants which question they were to answer (e.g., Remember/Familiar?). If the 
participant responded that the item was “new,” the next stimulus was immediately 
presented. The experimenter sitting beside the participant recorded responses via a 
button press. Participants did not receive feedback during the test phase. See Table 2 
for a list and description of dependent variables used for behavioral analysis and 






Memory Paradigm Dependent Variables 
 
Dependent Variable   Description 
Remembered  Recognized items classified as remembered 
Familiar  Recognized items classified as familiar 
Color-correct  





Remembered items with original color accurately 
identified 
Familiar color-correct  
Familiar items with original color accurately 
identified 
Task-correct  
Recognized items with semantic judgment accurately 
identified 
Remembered task-correct  
Remembered items with semantic judgment 
accurately identified 
Familiar task-correct  Familiar items with original task accurately identified 
Falsely familiar  Novel items incorrectly classified as familiar 
Falsely remembered  Novel items incorrectly classified as remembered 






Condition  Description 
Remembered1,2  Recognized items classified as remembered 
Familiar1,2  Recognized items classified as familiar 
Color-correct1,2  
Recognized items with original color accurately 
identified 
Color-incorrect1,2  
Recognized items with original color inaccurately 
identified 
Task-correct1,2  
Recognized items with semantic judgment accurately 
identified 
Task-incorrect1,2  
Recognized items with semantic judgment inaccurately 
identified 
Missed1  Items viewed at encoding incorrectly classified as “new” 
Correct Rejections2  Novel items correctly classified as “new” 




Classification task. After the memory task, participants performed the 
classification task. The experimenter explained that other participants had previously 
completed a memory study. They performed the same encoding task (i.e., identified 
item color and made a semantic judgment regarding animacy or size), but at retrieval 
they had to tell the experimenter what they remembered about the picture. An 
abridged description of the distinction between subjective judgments was provided 
(see Appendix C for the script associated with the classification task). During the 
task, the experimenter read one practice statement and 36 test statements to the 
participants and recorded whether the participants thought each statement met the 
criteria for a “remember” or “familiar” judgment. If necessary, the experimenter 
repeated the statement. The dependent variables from this task include the percentage 
of accurately classified remember and familiar statements. 
ERP recording and analysis. EEG was continuously recorded during the 
encoding phase of the study with a sampling rate of 512 Hz (BioSemi Active 2) from 
64 active Ag-AgCl scalp electrodes and two vertical and two horizontal 
electrooculogram (EOG) channels. Data were re-referenced offline using Brain 
Electrical Source Analysis (BESA) software (MEGIS Software GmbH, Gräfelfing, 
Germany) to an average mastoid configuration. Missing data from a maximum of 8 
bad channels per participant was interpolated in accordance with recommendations 
provided by researchers using the ERP methodology in developmental populations 
(DeBoer, Scott, & Nelson, 2005). Consistent with prior ERP studies of memory 
development (e.g., Cycowicz et al., 2001; Marshall, Drummey, Fox, & Newcombe, 




the Ille, Berg, and Scherg (2002) algorithm. Data were high and low pass filtered at .1 
and 80 Hz, respectively. Data were hand-edited to remove ocular artifacts that 
occurred at stimulus onset, movement-related artifact, and system-related artifact. 
ERPs were epoched with a 100 ms prestimulus baseline and extended to 1500 ms 
poststimulus onset. An automatic artifact rejection procedure was performed to 
remove trials that exceeded specified amplitude (250 µV), gradient (75 µV), and low-
signal (.01 µV) criteria.  ERPs for seven conditions (see Table 3) were averaged 
based on behavioral performance as described above (i.e., correct rejections were not 
applicable since EEG data was only collected during the encoding phase). Stimuli 
were included in multiple conditions (e.g., a recognized stimulus could be in the 
remembered, color-correct, and task-correct conditions). 
A total of 90 participants provided ERP data for at least one analysis of 
interest. Participants were excluded from all analyses due to problems with the 
reference electrode(s) (15 children, 2 adolescents, 2 adults) or if they contributed 
fewer than 10 trials per condition due to movement-related artifact or behavioral 
performance (9 children, 2 adolescents, 4 adults; DeBoer et al., 2005; 2007).  
For subjective recollection, participants were only included if they performed 
statistically above chance on the classification task (i.e., correctly classified 24 or 
more items correct out of 36). These criteria led to the inclusion of 17 children, 24 
adolescents, and 26 adults. For children, the mean trial numbers (standard deviation 
and range) were 32 missed (11, 10-38), 33 remember (15, 10-62), and 23 familiar (8, 
11-34). For adolescents, the mean trial numbers were 33 missed (11, 13-71), 33 




were 26 missed (11, 10-48), 31 remember (13, 14-59), and 34 familiar (14, 14-70). 
There were no age-related differences in trial numbers for missed, F(2, 64) = 2.03, p 
= .14, or remember conditions, F(2, 64) = .24, p = .784. However, adults had 
significantly more familiar trials than children, F(2, 64) = .3.74, p = .029. 
For the objective recollection analyses, participants were included only if their 
accuracy for the contextual detail of interest (i.e., color or semantic judgment) was 
greater than 55%. Participants were omitted on the basis of behavioral performance 
because recollection effects may not emerge when participants are performing at 
chance. For example, one study of adults showed that high performing but not low 
performing participants demonstrated recollection effects (e.g., Curran & Cleary, 
2003). The analysis of color recollection included 22 children, 18 adolescents, and 23 
adults. For children, the mean trial numbers were 33 missed (14, 10-71), 35 color-
correct (11, 15-55), and 21 color-incorrect (5, 12-30). For adolescents, the mean trial 
numbers were 36 missed (19, 13-71), 39 color-correct (13, 22-61), and 22 color-
incorrect (9, 10-38). For adults, the mean trial numbers were 24 missed (11, 10-56), 
43 color-correct (14, 21-71), and 25 color-incorrect (13, 10-70). Adults had 
significantly fewer missed trials than adolescents, F(2, 60) = 3.8, p = .028. The 
number of color-correct, F(2, 60) = 2.15, p = .125, and color-incorrect, F(2, 60) = 
1.23, p = .3, trials did not differ between age groups.  
The analysis of task recollection included 24 children, 25 adolescents, and 28 
adults. For children, the mean trial numbers were 34 missed (14, 10-71), 39 task-
correct (13, 14-63), and 17 task-incorrect (5, 10-26). For adolescents, the mean trial 




incorrect (8, 10-39). For adults, the mean trial numbers were 26 missed (12, 10-56), 
49 task-correct (13, 21-73), and 19 task-incorrect (7, 10-42). There were no 
differences in the number of missed, F(2, 74) = 1.95, p = .15, or task-incorrect trials, 
F(2, 74) = 1.52, p = .225. However, adults had significantly more task-correct trials 
than children F(2, 74) = 3.4, p = .039.  
Mean amplitudes, which are relatively unaffected by differences in 
trial numbers across conditions (Luck, 2005), were exported for analysis from 4 time 
windows that were selected based on previous literature (Duarte et al., 2004; Rollins 
& Riggins, 2013) and visual inspection. Mean amplitudes were exported for 150-300 
ms, 300-450 ms, 500-700 ms, 700-900 ms time windows for children and adolescents 
and 125-250 ms, 250-350 ms, 500-700 ms, and 700-900 ms time windows for adults. 
Consistent with previous developmental ERP studies of memory, it is common for the 
timing and width of analysis windows to differ across age groups in order to capture 
the components of interest (Cycowicz et al., 2003; Czernochowski et al., 2005; 
Marshall et al., 2002; Mecklinger et al., 2011; Rollins & Riggins, 2013; Sprondel et 
al., 2011). All analyses were performed using IBM SPSS Statistics 20. ERP data was 
analyzed using an omnibus ANOVA with Age Group (Children, Adolescents, Adults) 
as the between-subjects factor and the following within-subjects factors: 4 Time 
Window x 3 Condition x 3 Coronal Plane (frontal, central, parietal) x 3 Sagittal Plane 
(left, midline, right) at the following leads, F3, Fz, F4, C3, Cz, C4, P3, Pz, P4. 
Analyses are identical in structure for subjective recollection (remember, familiar, 
missed) and objective recollection of color (color-correct, color-incorrect, missed) 




effect of or interaction with condition was reported. The Bonferroni correction was 
applied to correct for multiple comparisons within analyses, and the Greenhouse 
Geisser correction was applied to correct for violations in sphericity (i.e., sphericity 
violations are common with ERP data).  An alpha level of .05 was used for all 
statistical analyses and, when necessary, follow-up analyses were conducted. 
Differences between conditions were assessed with Bonferroni-corrected pairwise 
comparisons and Bayes factors (BF). BFs provide the odds in support of the null 
hypothesis.  BFs > 1.0 suggest evidence in favor of the null hypothesis with BF > 3 
providing substantial support (Jeffreys, 1961). BFs < 1.0 suggest evidence in favor of 
the alternative hypothesis with BF < .33 indicating substantial support (Jeffreys, 
1961).  BFs were based on the t-statistic and obtained from the Bayes factor 
calculators provided on Dr. Jeffrey Rouder’s website 
(http://pcl.missouri.edu/bayesfactor) using the Jeffrey-Zellner-Siow prior (Rouder, 
Speckman, Sun, Morey, & Iverson, 2009).  
Results 
Behavioral results. 
Subjective recollection: Memory paradigm. A 3 Age Group (children, 
adolescents, adults) x 2 Subjective Judgment (remember, familiar) mixed-model 
ANOVA was conducted with the percentage of previously viewed items given each 
subjective judgment serving as the dependent variable. There was a significant age-
related improvement in the ability to accurately recognize previously viewed items, 




more “remember” than “familiar” judgments, F(1, 119) = 11.34, p = .001. Contrary to 
H1a, this effect did not interact with age F(2, 119) = 1.73, p = .182.  
 The same analysis was conducted using the percentage of falsely identified 
novel items as the dependent variable. There was a main effect of Subjective 
Judgment, F(1, 119) = 22.96, p < .001, that was qualified by an interaction between 
Age Group and Subjective Judgment, F(2, 119) = 3.7, p = .028. No age-related 
differences were present in false recognition rates associated with “remember” 
judgments, F(2, 119) = .75, p = .476. However, consistent with H1b, participants 
were more likely to provide “familiar” judgments to falsely recognized novel items 
with age, F(2, 119) = 3.22, p = .043 (see Figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1. Mean accurate and false recognition rates for children, adolescents, and 
adults. Accurate recognition rates were higher in children than adolescents and adults, 
and more accurately recognized items were provided with “remember” than familiar 
judgments. Older participants were more likely to provide novel items falsely 
recognized with a “familiar” judgment.  Error bars represent standard errors.  
 
Subjective recollection: Classification task. To assess whether all age groups 
reliably classified subjective judgments, a one sample t-test was conducted on the 




hypothesis was set at .5). Consistent with H1c, children, t(53) = 14.31, p < .001; 
adolescents, t(30) = 73.26, p < .001; adults, t(36) = 85.29, p < .001, all reliably 
classified statements. Age-related differences in this task were assessed using a 3 Age 
Group x 2 Subjective Judgment mixed-model ANOVA where percent accuracy from 
the classification task was included as the dependent variable. Results revealed main 
effects of age group, F(2, 119) = 7.19, p = .001, and subjective judgment, F(1, 119) = 
14.05, p < .001, as well as an interaction between age group and subjective judgment, 
F(2, 119) = 7.75, p = .001.  Age-related improvements were larger in the 
classification of statements that should have received “remember”, F(2, 119) = 9.33, 
p < .001, versus “familiar” judgments,  F(2, 119) = 2.51, p = .085 (see Figure 2).  
These findings support H1d; there were age-related improvements in children’s 
ability to classify subjective statements. 
 
Figure 2. Accuracy rates for “remember” and “familiar” statements on the 
classification task. All age groups performed above chance. Children were less 
accurate at classifying “remember” statements than adolescents and adults.  Error bars 
represent standard errors. 
 
Objective recollection. Measures of objective recollection were analyzed 




semantic judgment is expected to be higher than memory for the color of an item 
because semantic information is more deeply encoded; e.g., Ghetti et al., 2011). To 
assess hypotheses regarding age-related differences in objective recollection, a 3 Age 
Group x 2 Objective Judgment (color, semantic judgment) mixed-mixed model 
ANOVA was conducted. The percentage of items for which the contextual detail was 
accurately recollected relative to correctly recognized items served as the dependent 
variable. Participants more accurately remembered the semantic judgment made at 
encoding than the original color of the item, F(1, 121) = 48.75, p < .001. Consistent 
with hypotheses H1e and H1f, children performed more poorly on measures of 
objective recollection than adolescents and adults, F(1, 121) = 4.61, p = .012. No 
interaction was present between objective judgment type and age group, F(1, 121) = 
1.39, p = .253. 
Correspondence between subjective and objective recollection.. To examine 
age-related differences in the accurate use of subjective judgments, a 3 Age Group x 
2 Subjective Judgment (remember, familiar) x 2 Objective Judgment (color, 
semantic) mixed-model ANOVA was conducted (see Figure 3). Accuracy for the 
objective details was higher when participants provided “remember” judgments than 
when they provided “familiar” judgments, F(1, 116) = 41.77, p < .001,  and this effect 
did not interact with age, F(2, 116) = 1.27, p = .286. The finding that children, 
adolescents, and adults utilized the subjective judgments similarly when they were 





Figure 3. Mean accuracy rates for objective details as a function of subjective 
judgment. Memory for objective details was higher when participants provided 
“remember” versus “familiar” judgments. The judgment made at encoding was better 
remembered than the original color of the item. Overall, children had poorer memory 





ERP results. Grand average waveforms depicting conditions included in the 
analyses of subjective recollection, color recollection, and task recollection are shown 
in Figures 4, 5, and 6, respectively. As described below, analyses of the subjective 
measure of recollection revealed that neural activity at encoding was sensitive to 
recollection (i.e., the amplitude of the response elicited to items later given 
“remember” judgments was more positive than items given “familiar” judgments or 
missed items). Further, this effect did not differ as a function of age. Subsequent 
recollection effects were also found when recollection was indexed by memory for 
the semantic judgment made at encoding. However, subsequent recollection effects 
were not found when recollection was indexed by memory for the item’s color. 
Results below are for the 700-900 ms time window; analyses associated with the 
other three time windows are reported in Appendix E. 
Subsequent subjective recollection2. Analysis of subjective recollection 
revealed a main effect of Condition, F(2, 128) = 7.19, p = .001. The results revealed a 
recollection effect with amplitude to items subsequently given “remember” 
judgments being more positive than items given “familiar” judgments (t = 2.838, p = 
.018, BF = .245) and missed items (t = 3.828, p = .001, BF = .014), which did not 
differ from one another (t = .828, p = 1.0, BF = 7.434; see Figure 4). This effect is 
consistent with H3a and does not support age-related differences in the timing, 
topography, or direction of the subsequent subjective recollection effect (RQ1).  
                                                 
2 Behavioral performance was comparable between participants included in the subjective recollection 
ERP analysis and the full sample.  The task performed at encoding was better remembered than the 
color of the item, F(1, 64) = 64.51, p < .001, and participants were more accurate for objective details 
when they provided remember versus familiar judgments, F(1, 64) = 53.33, p < .001.  However, 
memory for objective details did not differ as a function of Age Group in this subset of participants, 





Figure 4. Grand average waveforms recorded at encoding illustrating ERPs to items 
subsequently classified as remembered, familiar, and missed. Bar graph represents 
mean amplitude in the 700-900 ms window collapsed across all analyzed electrodes 
and age groups. The mean amplitude elicited to remembered items was more positive 




Subsequent color recollection. Analysis of color recollection revealed a main 
effect of Condition, F(2, 120) = 3.27, p = .048. The results revealed that items 
subsequently identified with the color-correct elicited a larger amplitude response 
than missed items (t = 2.78, p = .022, BF = .279); the amplitude of the response 
elicited to color-incorrect items was similar to color-correct (t = .08, p = 1.0, BF = 
10.069) and missed items (t = 1.921, p = .179, BF = 1.727; see Figure 5). This effect 
partially supports H3b, which posited that the amplitude to color-correct and color-
incorrect items would be larger than missed items. 
 
Figure 5. Grand average waveforms recorded at encoding illustrating ERPs to items 
subsequently classified as color-correct, color-incorrect, and missed. Bar graph 
represents mean amplitude in the 700-900 ms window collapsed across all analyzed 
electrodes and age groups. The mean amplitude elicited to color-correct items was 




Subsequent task recollection. When recollection was indexed by accurate 
memory for the semantic judgment made at encoding, there was a main effect of 
Condition, F(4, 296) = 2.44, p = .012. The results revealed a recollection effect with 
amplitude to subsequently task-correct items being more positive than task-incorrect 
(t = 2.694, p = .026, BF = .362) and missed items (t = 2.767, p = .021, BF = .303), 
which did not differ from one another (t = .104, p = 1.0, BF = 11.078; see Figure 
6).This pattern of results does not support H3c, which posited a recognition effect 
(i.e., that the amplitude to task-correct and task-incorrect items would be larger than 
the amplitude of the response to missed items). 
 
Figure 6. Grand average waveforms recorded at encoding illustrating ERPs to items 
subsequently classified as task-correct, task-incorrect, and missed. Bar graph 




electrodes and age groups. The mean amplitude elicited to task-correct items was 
more positive than task-incorrect and missed items. Error bars represent standard 
errors. 
Chapter 3: Study 2 
Method 
Participants. A total of 103 participants provided complete behavioral data 
for this study; 41 children (mean age = 7.44 years, SD = .56, 28 females, 13 males), 
26 adolescents (mean age = 12.66 years, SD = .64, 18 females, 8 males), 36 adults 
(mean age = 20.23 years, SD = 2.3, 23 females, 13 males). An additional 5 
participants came in for the study but were excluded due to equipment failure (1 
adolescent, 2 adults), illness (1 adult), or noncompliance (1 child). One adult 
participant was excluded from subjective recollection analyses because she verbally 
indicated that she did not use the judgments correctly. One adult participant was 
excluded from the analysis examining the correspondence between objective and 
subjective recollection because he provided “familiar” judgments for all recognized 
stimuli. 
Procedures. This design of this study is similar to Study 1; however, ERPs 
were recorded at the retrieval rather than the encoding portion of the study. The 
encoding portion was identical to Study 1. After encoding, the Lycra cap was applied 
resulting in a delay of approximately 15 minutes between encoding and retrieval. 
After the EEG cap was applied, participants were given instructions for the retrieval 
phase. To further clarify the distinction between remember/familiar judgments, the 
following exemplars were added to participant instructions: 
 “For example, you could remember the lamp because I asked you if it was 




the participant began with the animacy or size task] because it was the first 
picture you saw.   You could remember that you saw a ball because it was red, 
and I asked you if it could fit inside of the box. You could remember a 
sunflower because you thought of whether you would be taller than it. If you 
remember any detail about the picture, you should say you remember it.” 
 After receiving instructions, participants completed a practice phase to ensure 
they understood the task and that they needed to verbally respond only after the words 
“old/new” appeared on the screen. Each stimulus was presented for 1500 ms while 
ERPs were recorded. After 1500 ms elapsed, the words “old/new” appeared and 
participants were prompted to make a recognition judgment, subjective recollection 
judgment, and objective recollection judgments regarding the item’s original color 
and the task performed at encoding. Following the memory paradigm, participants 
completed the classification task, and then the cap was removed. 
ERP recording and analysis. The same procedures were used for ERP 
recording and analysis as for Study 1. A total of 84 participants provided ERP data 
for at least one analysis of interest. Participants were excluded from all analyses due 
to problems with the reference electrode(s) (2 children), poor quality EEG (2 
children, 1 adolescent, 2 adults), failure to record the EEG data (1 child), or 
contributing fewer than 10 trials per condition due to movement-related artifact or 
behavioral performance (8 children, 1 adolescent, 2 adults).  
For the analysis of subjective recollection, participants were only included if 
they performed statistically above chance on the classification task. These criteria led 




trial numbers (standard deviation and range) were 38 correct rejections (8, 27-53), 24 
remember (9, 11-39), and 19 familiar (8, 10-38). For adolescents, the mean trial 
numbers were 45 correct rejections (10, 29-58), 32 remember (16, 15-72), and 31 
familiar (14, 11-54). For adults, the mean trial numbers were 46 correct rejections (7, 
30-59), 34 remember (15, 13-70), and 30 familiar (16, 11-76). Children had fewer 
trials than adults and adolescents for all 3 conditions, Fs(2, 65) = 3.58-6.52  ps = 
.003-.033.  
Participants were only included in ERP analyses of objective recollection if 
the contextual detail of interest (i.e., color or semantic judgment) was recollected 
accurately for greater than 55% of recognized items (see Methods for Study 1 for 
justification). These criteria led to the inclusion of 17 children, 16 adolescents, and 20 
adults for the analysis of color recollection. The mean trial numbers (standard 
deviation and range) for children were as follows: 37 correct rejections (9, 18-47), 26 
color-correct (9, 12-40), 17 color-incorrect (10-27). For adolescents, the mean trial 
numbers were 43 correct rejections (10, 28-56), 41 color-correct (11, 19-63), 25 
color-incorrect (8, 11-37). For adults, the mean trial numbers were 46 correct 
rejections (8, 30-59), 46 color-correct (12, 15-65), and 22 color-incorrect (7, 14-40). 
Children had fewer trials than adults and adolescents for all 3 conditions, Fs(2, 50) = 
4.6-14.53  ps = <.001-.015. 
The analysis of task recollection included 17 children, 19 adolescents, and 28 
adults. The mean trial numbers (standard deviation and range) for children were as 
follows: 37 correct rejections (10, 16-49), 29 task-correct (10, 15-47), 14 task-




(9, 30-58), 48 task-correct (10, 25-67), 20 task-incorrect (7, 10-35). For adults, the 
mean trial numbers were 45 correct rejections (7, 30-59), 46 task-correct (14, 26-76), 
and 20 task-incorrect (7, 10-39). Children had fewer trials than adults and adolescents 
for all 3 conditions, Fs(2, 61) = 4.35-13.34  ps = <.001-.017. 
Mean amplitudes, which are relatively uninfluenced by differences in trial 
numbers across conditions (Luck, 2005), were exported from 4 time windows for 
analysis based on previous literature (e.g., Duarte et al., 2004) and visual inspection. 
Mean amplitudes were exported for 150-300 ms, 300-450 ms, 500-700 ms, 700-900 
ms time windows for children and 125-250 ms, 250-450 ms, 500-700 ms, and 700-
900 ms time windows for adolescents and adults. 
Results 
Behavioral results. 
Subjective recollection: Memory paradigm. There was a significant age-
related improvement in accurate recognition, F(2, 99) = 14, p < .001. Children 
correctly identified fewer items than adolescents and adults (see Figure 7). Contrary 
to H1g, age-related decreases in the provision of “remember” judgments were not 
present, F(2, 99) = 2.43, p = .093 (see Figure 7).  
 Participants were more likely to provide “familiar” than “remember” 
judgments for falsely recognized items, F(1, 99) = 9.45, p = .003 (see Figure 7).  No 
age-related changes were present in false recognition, F(2, 99) = .55, p = .581, and, 
contrary to H1h, no interaction was present between age and subjective judgment 





Figure 7. Mean accurate and false recognition rates for children, adolescents, and 
adults. Accurate recognition rates were higher in children than adolescents and adults, 
and more accurately recognized items were provided with “remember” than familiar 
judgments. Older participants were more likely to provide novel items falsely 




Subjective recollection: Classification task. All age groups reliably classified 
statements as meeting the criteria for a “remember” or “familiar” judgment, 
consistent with H1i; children, t(39) = 21.08, = p < .001;  adolescents, t(25) = 17.26, = 
p < .001; adults, t(34) = 51.83, = p < .001. Performance on this task differed as a 
function of participant age, F(2, 98) = 3.39, p = .038, subjective judgment, F(1, 98) = 
6.13, p = .015 , and an interaction between age group and subjective judgment, F(2, 
98) = 4.1, p = .02. In support of H1j, age-related improvements were present in the 
classification of statements that should have been associated “remember,” F(2, 98) = 
5.53, p = .005, but not “familiar” judgments, F(2, 98) = .49, p = .61 (see Figure 8). 
 
Figure 8. Accuracy rates for “remember” and “familiar” statements on the 
classification task. All age groups performed above chance. Children were less 
accurate at classifying “remember” statements than adolescents and adults.  Error bars 
represent standard errors. 
 
Objective recollection. Participants were more likely to remember the 
judgment made at encoding than the original color of the item, F(1, 100) = 60.61, p < 
.001. This effect was qualified by an interaction between age group and objective 
judgment, F(2, 100) = 4.15, p = .019.  In contrast to H1k, memory for the original 




related improvements were present in memory for the judgment made at encoding, 
F(2, 100) = 4.74, p = .011, consistent with H1l.  Children were less likely to recollect 
the task performed at encoding than adolescents or adults; adolescents and adults 
performed similarly. Thus, age-related changes were present in memory for task 
performed at encoding but not the original color of the item. 
Correspondence between subjective and objective recollection. Across age 
groups, participants accurately used the subjective judgments; however, this ability 
improved with age (Figure 9). Memory for objective contextual details was higher 
when participants provided “remember” judgments than when they provided 
“familiar” judgments, F(1, 98) = 36.48, p < .001. However, this effect interacted with 
the type of objective judgment and age group, F(2, 98) = 4.083, p = .02. In children, 
there was a main effect of subjective judgment, F(1, 40) = 8.16, p = .007, and a 
marginal subjective judgment x objective judgment interaction, F(1, 40) = 3.57, p = 
.066. Children’s “remember” judgments were associated with higher accuracy for the 
original color of the item, t(40) = 3.281, p = .002, BF = .077, but not the semantic 
judgment made at encoding, t(40) = .546, p = .588, BF = 7.099. In adolescents, there 
were main effects of objective judgment, F(1, 25) = 17.02, p < .001, and subjective 
judgment, F(1, 25) = 13.04, p = .001. Adolescents were more likely to remember the 
task performed at encoding than the original color of the item, and memory for the 
color and task judgments was higher when they made “remember” versus “familiar” 
judgments. Similarly, main effects of objective judgment, F(1, 33) = 33.92, p < .001, 
and subjective judgment, F(1, 34) = 14.45, p = .001, were present in adults. Memory 




adults were more accurate at identifying the color of and judgment made for items 
they reported “remembering” than for “familiar” items.  The finding that accurate 
memory for objective details was increasingly associated with “remember” judgments 
with age is consistent with H2b. 
 
Figure 9. Mean accuracy rates for objective details as a function of subjective 
judgment. Memory for objective details was higher when participants provided 
“remember” versus “familiar” judgments. The judgment made at encoding was better 
remembered than the original color of the item. In children, “remember” and 
“familiar” judgments did not distinguish which items were recollected along with the 
task detail. Error bars represent standard errors. 
ERP results. Grand average waveforms depicting conditions included in the 
analyses of subjective recollection, color recollection, and task recollection are shown 
in Figures 7, 8, and 9, respectively. Subjective recollection analyses revealed age-
related differences in subjective recollection at retrieval. Consistent with previous 
literature (for review see Rugg & Curran, 2007), adults demonstrated a recollection 
effect (i.e., a more positive response to remembered than familiar and novel items) 
that was focused over left parietal leads in the 500-700 ms window. Adolescents also 
demonstrated a recollection effect; however, it was more widespread in topography. 




effect.  Recollection effects were not found when either accurate memory for color or 
the task performed at encoding was used as an index of recollection. Results below 
are for the 500-700 ms time window; analyses from three additional time windows 
are reported in Appendix E. 
Subjective recollection3. For the analysis of subjective recollection, there was 
an Age Group x Condition interaction, F(4, 130) = 4.57, p = .002, and an Age Group 
x Condition x Sagittal Plane interaction, F(8, 260) = 2.86, p = .012. Follow-up 
analyses were conducted separately for each age group. No main effect of or 
interaction with Condition was present in children. Bayes factors revealed no support 
in favor of differences in amplitude between items given remembered versus familiar 
items (t = 1.525, p = .431, BF = 2.033) or between correctly rejected novel items and 
either remembered (t = 1.308, p = .619, BF = 2.656) or familiar items (t = .34, p = 
1.0, BF = 5.544).  A significant main effect of Condition was present in adolescents, 
F(2, 36) = 7.3, p = .002. The results suggested a recollection effect with remembered 
items showing a trend of eliciting a more positive response than familiar items (t = 
2.36, p = .089, BF = .553) and significantly eliciting a more positive response than 
correctly rejected items (t = 4.447, p = .001, BF = .01; see Figure 10). No difference 
was present between remembered and familiar items (t = .86, p = 1.0, BF = 4.037). In 
adults, there was a main effect of Condition, F(2, 56) = 7.1, p = .002, that was 
                                                 
3  Participants included in the subjective recollection ERP analysis remembered the task performed at 
encoding better than the color of the item, F(1, 65) = 45.52, p < .001. No Objective Judgment x Age 
Group interaction was present, F(2, 65) = .8, p = .45. Although higher accuracy for objective details 
was associated with the use of remember judgments in all age groups, accurate use of subjective 
judgments improved with age, F(2, 65) = 3.23, p = .046.  Further, a larger difference in accuracy 
between remembered and familiar item was present for the task versus the color detail, F(1, 65) =  
5.94, p = .018. The Objective Judgment x Subjective Judgment x Age Group interaction was not 





qualified by a Condition x Coronal Plane interaction, F(4, 112) = 4.09, p = .01, and a 
Condition x Sagittal Plane interaction, F(4, 112) = 4.44, p = .002. This pattern of 
results emerged because, consistent with previous studies, the recollection in effect in 
adults was maximal over left centro-parietal leads (see Figure 10). When follow-up 
analyses were conducted separately for each Sagittal Plane, a recollection effect was 
present across left leads (i.e., F3, C3, P3), F(2, 56) = 6.41, p = .003. Response 
amplitude was more positive to remembered than familiar (t = 2.968, p = .018, BF = 
.168) and correctly rejected novel items (t = 3.189, p = .011, BF = .103), which did 
not differ from one another (t = .058, p = 1.0, BF = 6.957). For midline leads, there 
was a main effect of Condition, F(2, 56) = 8.84, p < .001, and a Condition x Coronal 
Plane interaction,  F(4, 112) = 5.11, p = .003. A main effect of condition was present 
at midline frontal, F(2, 56) = 3.24, p = .047, central, F(2, 56) = 8.82, p < .001, and 
parietal leads, F(2, 56) = 11.5, p < .001.  At the midline frontal lead, no significant 
differences were present between remembered, familiar, and correctly rejected items 
(t = .646-2.208, p = .107-1.0, BF = .782-5.696).  A significant recollection effect was 
present at the central midline lead; the response elicited to remembered items was 
more positive than familiar (t = 3.511, p = .005, BF = .049) and correctly rejected 
novel items (t = 3.37, p = .007, BF = .007), which did not differ from one another (t = 
.343, p = 1.0, BF = 6.581). At the parietal midline lead, the response amplitude to 
familiar items was less than correctly rejected (t = 2.54, p = .051, BF = .414) and 
remembered items (t = 4.944, p < .001, BF = .001), which did not differ from one 
another (t = 2.235, p = .101, BF = .744).  For right leads, there was a there was a main 




interaction,  F(4, 112) = 3.98, p = .005. No main effect of Condition was present at 
right frontal or central leads. A main effect of Condition was present at the right 
parietal lead, F(2, 56) = 10.65, p < .001. Similar to the effect at the midline parietal 
lead, the response amplitude to familiar items was less than correctly rejected (t = 
3.109, p = .013, BF = .122) and remembered items (t = 4.749, p < .001, BF = .002), 
which did not differ from one another (t = 1.525, p = .415, BF = 2.347).  Overall, this 
pattern of results is consistent with H3d. Adults and adolescents demonstrated a 
recollection effect. Further, in response to RQ2, the recollection effect at retrieval 
differed as a function of age; the effect was absent in children, widespread in 






Figure 10. Grand average waveforms recorded at retrieval illustrating ERPs to items 
classified as remembered, familiar, and correctly rejected. Bar graph represents mean 
amplitude in the 500-700 ms window. For children and adolescents, mean amplitudes 
were collapsed across all analyzed electrodes. In adults, mean amplitudes were 
collapsed across left electrodes (F3, C3, P3). In adolescents, a recollection effect was 
widespread as indexed by a main effect of Condition whereas in adults the 






Color recollection. In the third time window (500-700 ms) there was a 
significant Condition x Sagittal Plane interaction, F(4, 200) = 3.06, p = .026, and a 
Condition x Coronal Plane x Sagittal Plane interaction, F(8, 400) = 2.26, p = .045. 
However, no main effect of or interaction with condition was present in follow-up 
analyses conducted at each sagittal and coronal plane (see Figure 11). These findings 
do not lend support for the hypothesis that a recollection effect would be present 
when the color of the item was accurately identified (H3e; RQ3). 
 
Figure 11. Grand average waveforms recorded at retrieval illustrating ERPs to items 
classified as color-correct, color-incorrect, and correctly rejected. Bar graph 
represents mean amplitude in the 500-700 ms window collapsed across all analyzed 
electrodes and age groups. No recognition or recollection effects were present. Error 




Task recollection. In the third time window (500-700 ms), there was a 
Condition x Coronal Plane interaction, F(4, 244) = 5.53, p = .002, and a Condition x 
Sagittal Plane interaction, F(4, 244) = 5.32, p = .001, that was qualified by Age 
Group, F(8, 244) = 3.3, p = .002. In children, there was a Condition x Sagittal Plane 
interaction, F(4, 64) = 4.04, p = .006. Follow-up analyses conducted at each sagittal 
plane revealed no main effect of or interaction with condition at left, midline, or right 
leads. In adolescents, there was a Condition x Coronal Plane interaction, F(4, 72) = 
5.33, p = .004. At central leads there was a Condition x Sagittal Plane interaction, 
F(4, 72) = 3.15, p = .036. A main effect of Condition was present at the central 
midline lead, F(2, 36) = 5.46, p = .008. This effect was sensitive to item recognition; 
the amplitude of the response elicited to task-correct (t = 3.162, p = .016, BF = .125) 
and task-incorrect items (t = 3.181, p = .016, BF = .121) was more positive than the 
response to correctly rejected items (see Figure 12). No difference was present 
between task-correct and task-incorrect items (t = .636, p = 1.0, BF = 4.721). A 
recognition effect was also present across parietal leads, F(2, 36) = 4.57, p = .017. No 
main effect of or interaction with Condition was present in adults. These findings do 
not lend support for the hypothesis that a recollection effect would be present when 





Figure 12. Grand average waveforms recorded at retrieval illustrating ERPs to items 
classified as task-correct, task-incorrect, and correctly rejected. Bar graph represents 
mean amplitude in the 500-700 ms window at Cz in adolescents who demonstrated a 
recollection effect. Error bars represent standard errors. 
Chapter 4: Discussion 
The present studies examined ERP correlates of subjective and objective 
recollection at encoding and retrieval in children, adolescents, and adults. Behavioral 
improvements in memory performance were demonstrated across both studies, and 
ERP results shed insight into the nature of these developmental differences at the 
neural level. During encoding, ERP responses were sensitive to recollection (i.e., 
responses were larger in amplitude to remembered than familiar or missed items) 




age-related differences were present in this response suggesting similarity of 
processing at encoding across age groups. At retrieval, ERP responses were only 
associated with recollection when recollection was indexed subjectively, and this 
effect differed as a function of age. A recollection effect was absent in children, 
widespread in adolescents, and maximal over left centro-parietal leads in adults. 
Collectively, these findings suggest that recollection effects may be more apparent 
using subjective versus objective measures of recollection and that improvement in 
recollection between middle childhood and adulthood is primarily attributable to the 
development of consolidation, storage, or retrieval processes. 
ERP correlates of subjective recollection  
ERPs recorded during encoding were sensitive to subjective recollection and 
recollection of the task performed at encoding. These effects did not differ between 6- 
to 8-year-old children, 12- to 13-year-old adolescents, and adults. The effect observed 
at encoding was widespread and present during the 700-900 ms time window, 
consistent with previous studies in adults (Duarte et al., 2004; Friedman & Trott, 
2000; Mangels et al., 2001; Yovel & Paller, 2004). The similarity of this effect across 
age groups contributes to the current literature on the development of encoding 
processes that suggests improvement in encoding abilities between 6 and 8 years of 
age (Ghetti & Angelini, 2008; Rollins & Riggins, 2013). Less mature encoding 
abilities in 6-year-old children have been demonstrated by an ERP investigation that 
found age-related differences in the timing, direction, and topography of subsequent 
recognition effects between 6-year-old children and adults (Rollins & Riggins, 2013). 




estimates of familiarity similar to 8- and 10-year-old children when they were given a 
longer duration of time to encode items (Ghetti & Angelini, 2008). However, the lack 
of age-related differences differs from fMRI studies of subjective and objective 
recollection in developmental populations which suggests developmental differences 
in the specificity of neural regions involved in encoding between middle childhood 
through adolescence (Ghetti et al., 2010; Güler & Thomas, 2013; Ofen et al., 2007). 
Methodological differences, such as the use of fMRI methodology and the paradigms 
utilized, likely contribute to differences in findings across investigations. 
Results suggested that developmental differences in subjective recollection 
were present in ERP responses elicited during retrieval. ERPs in children did not 
differ as a function of memory.  In adults, consistent with previous literature (for 
reviews see Friedman & Johnson, 2000; Rugg & Curran, 2007), the left parietal 
old/new effect in the 500-700 ms time window was sensitive to recollection. 
Adolescents demonstrated a similar, yet less localized, effect. Other studies using 
exclusion, speeded/nonspeeded recognition, or continuous recognition tasks have 
reported similar parietal old/new effects in children/adolescents and adults 
(Czernochowski et al., 2005; Mecklinger et al., 2011; Spondrel et al., 2011; 2012). 
These authors argue that the ERP correlate of recollection is present in children and 
that memory development is primarily due to improvements strategic recollection and 
post-retrieval evaluation of retrieved information (e.g., Sprondel et al., 2012). 
However, none of the paradigms utilized by those researchers examine the ability to 
engage in subjective recollection, an ability that could also be undergoing 




The present study found that neural activity at retrieval associated with 
subjective recollection was localized over left centro-parietal leads in adults but 
widespread in adolescents. Within the field of developmental cognitive neuroscience, 
age-related increases in the localization and specialization of neural activity is 
common and has been associated with the development of neural regions and their 
connectivity (e.g., Johnson, 2001). This pattern of results has been demonstrated in 
research on language (e.g., Mills, Coffey-Corina, & Neville, 1997), face processing 
(e.g., Halit, de Haan, & Johnson, 2003), and memory (e.g., Ghetti et al., 2010; Güler 
& Thomas, 2013).  Within the memory literature, hippocampal activity at encoding 
becomes increasingly specialized for recollection between 8- and 14 years of age 
(Ghetti et al., 2010). Furthermore, at retrieval, 8- to 9-year-old children were less 
likely to recruit regions of left ventrolateral prefrontal cortex and left inferior parietal 
cortex than 12- and 13-year-old children (Güler & Thomas, 2013). Thus, it is possible 
that the increased development of and connectivity between neural regions that 
support recollection in adults (i.e., medial temporal lobes, prefrontal cortex, parietal 
cortex) led to the developmental differences in ERP correlates of subjective 
recollection observed in the present study. 
ERP correlates of objective recollection  
Although behavioral results demonstrated that participants’ subjective 
judgments aligned with their accuracy for objective contextual details, few ERP 
correlates of objective recollection were present.  When recollection was indexed by 
memory for the original color of the item, ERP responses were not sensitive to 




performed at encoding was used as the index of recollection, ERPs at encoding, but 
not retrieval, were indicative of recollection.  This finding is consistent with within-
subject studies of adults that have reported larger ERP recollection effects for 
subjective versus objective assessments of recollection (Duarte et al., 2004; Friedman 
& Trott, 2000; Trott et al., 1999). However, many published studies do report 
recollection effects at retrieval when using objective measures of recollection 
(Curran, 2000; Rugg, Schloerscheidt, Doyle, Cox, & Patching, 1996; Trott, Friedman, 
Ritter, & Fabiani, 1997; Wilding, 1999; Wilding, Doyle, & Rugg, 1995; Wilding & 
Rugg, 1996, 1997a, 1997b).  The discrepancy between the present and previous 
studies cannot be accounted for by accuracy rates or the delay between encoding and 
retrieval. One difference between the current studies and previous investigations is 
that the perceptual characteristics of stimuli were altered between encoding and 
retrieval. During encoding, stimuli were presented as red or green, and, at retrieval, 
they were viewed in grayscale. A recent study showed that the parietal old/new effect 
was attenuated when perceptual characteristics of stimuli were altered at retrieval 
(Groh-Bordin, Zimmer, & Ecker, 2006). Thus, it is possible that this methodological 
decision attenuated and masked the influence of objective recollection on the parietal 
old/new effect. 
Behavioral improvements in objective and subjective recollection  
The behavioral results demonstrated age-related improvements in memory for 
objective contextual details, consistent with previous investigations (Cycowicz et al., 
2001; Cycowicz et al., 2003 Ghetti & Angelini, 2008; Ghetti et al., 2010; Ghetti et al., 




and colleagues (2011), both studies suggest that memory for the task performed at 
encoding surpassed memory for the original color of the item.  This finding is 
consistent with the rich literature on deep versus shallow encoding conditions (e.g., 
Craik & Lockhart, 1972). Making a semantic judgment about an item’s animacy or 
size requires conceptual processing resulting in a deeper and more salient encoding 
experience than providing the color of the item. Memory for these objective 
contextual details also differed in their developmental trajectories. Memory for the 
original color of the item was similar across age groups whereas memory for the task 
performed at encoding was lower in children than in adolescents and adults.  The 
stability of memory for color across age groups could be explained by the fact that it 
is a perceptual characteristic that it is capable of being unitized with the item. A 
recent theory suggests that contextual details that can be unitized with the item (e.g., 
item color) can be supported by different neural regions within the MTL than 
contextual details that must be bound to items (e.g., memory for the task performed at 
encoding; Diana, Yonelinas, & Ranganath, 2007). Future research is needed to 
investigate the developmental trajectory of memory for unitized and non-unitized 
contextual details. 
Children, adolescents, and adults were capable of making subjective memory 
judgments. Memory for objective contextual details was higher when participants 
provided remember versus familiar judgments. This pattern of results is consistent 
with previous studies employing the modified remember/know paradigm in children 
(Ghetti et al., 2011; Hembacher & Ghetti, 2013). Ghetti and colleagues have 




by memory for color than older age groups (Ghetti et al., 2011; Hembacher & Ghetti, 
2013). The present studies provide mixed support for this hypothesis. In Study 1 
remember judgments in children were associated with better memory for the task 
performed at encoding but not the color of the item. For Study 2, analysis of all 
children showed the opposite pattern; remember judgments were associated with 
better memory for color but not the task performed at encoding.  However, remember 
judgments in children included in the ERP analysis of subjective recollection for 
Study 2, which required that participants contribute a minimum of 10 ERP trials 
associated with remember and familiar judgments and perform above chance 
performance on the classification task, were associated with better memory for the 
task performed at encoding but not the color of the item. Thus, while it is possible 
that children differentially rely on perceptual versus semantic information when 
making subjective judgments of recollection, the children included in the present ERP 
analyses show the more mature pattern where subjective recollection is 
predominantly associated with memory for semantic information.  
Future directions  
The present studies serve as the foundation for multiple avenues of future 
research. Evidence from ERP and behavioral investigations suggest age-related 
changes in encoding processes (or other abilities associated with encoding processes, 
such as processing speed) between 6 and 8 years of age and stability thereafter (Ghetti 
& Angelini, 2008; Rollins & Riggins, 2013), highlighting early childhood as an 
interesting period of investigation for the development of encoding processes. Future 




stimulus exposure) as well as the contribution of structural and functional brain 
development to encoding efficiency. The current findings also suggest that the 
development of subjective recollection between middle childhood and adulthood is 
primarily due to the development of storage, consolidation, or retrieval operations. 
One limitation of the present study is the inability to determine whether age-related 
differences are specifically due to storage, consolidation, or retrieval operations. 
Storage and consolidation are continuous processes and thus less amenable to 
investigation utilizing the ERP methodology which requires the time-locking of 
events. Future studies are needed to dissociate the developmental trajectories of 
storage, consolidation, and retrieval processes.   
Another topic of current interest within the field of memory research is 
whether the development of retrieval is related to the improvement of processes 
specific to memory or those that support memory (e.g., executive functioning). 
Specifically, recollection is theoretically related to executive functioning because, in 
order to accurately recollect contextual details from memory, those details must be 
strategically searched for, maintained in working memory for evaluation, and selected 
from competing details (Dobbins & Han, 2006; Fletcher & Henson, 2001; Simons & 
Spiers, 2003). Some data suggests that objective recollection, which requires the 
recollection of specific contextual details, may be more sensitive to executive 
functioning than subjective recollection (Duarte et al., 2005). However, no studies 
have examined these relations in developmental populations.  
Only recently have developmental researchers begun to examine children’s 




episodic memory considered core by Tulving (1985). This is an important area for 
future research because of the hypothesized relations between subjective 
remembering and emergence of the self (Buckner & Carroll, 2007; Howe & Courage, 
1997; Rajaram & Roediger, 1997). Future research is needed to understand the 
relation between subjective recollection and other cognitive abilities, such as 
executive functioning, as discussed above, and theory of mind. Theory of mind, the 
ability to understand the thoughts and desires of others, has been theoretically related 
to the ability recall personal memories (e.g., Perner, Kloo, & Stöttinger, 2007). 
However, few studies have empirically examined relations between these abilities. 
Conclusions  
 
In summary, the present dissertation suggests that the development of 
recollection between middle childhood and young adulthood is primarily due to 
improvement in processes associated with consolidation, storage, or retrieval since 
neural activity at encoding was similar between children, adolescents, and adult. 
Further, ERP effects differed based on whether recollection was indexed using the 
modified remember/know paradigm or as accuracy for the color of the item or the 







Development of metamemory: Implications for investigations of episodic 
remembering 
When thinking about our past we experience a subjective state called 
remembering. Remembering has been defined as the phenomenological experience of 
reliving events and tying them to our personal past (Tulving, 1985). For example, 
when reflecting upon your recent birthday you may remember the sound of your 
family and friends singing you “Happy Birthday”, the flickering of the candles on 
your birthday cake, and how happy you felt in that moment. Remembering is a 
complex cognitive enterprise and has been theorized to support many higher order 
cognitive abilities, including our understanding of the causal and temporal structure 
of events, consideration of the perspectives of others, perception of ourselves as 
continuous across time, and our ability to envision future events (e.g., Buckner & 
Carroll, 2007; Rajaram & Roediger, 1997; Schacter, Addis, & Buckner, 2007). The 
most widely utilized tool to investigate remembering in adults is the remember/know 
paradigm, an introspective memory task (Tulving, 1985). During this task participants 
must decide whether each item is “remembered” along with contextual detail(s) or 
whether they merely “know” it was previously encountered. Because of concerns 
regarding children’s introspective capacities (Brainerd et al., 2003, 2004; Ghetti et al., 
2002), relatively few studies have examined the development of memory 




The aim of this literature review is to consider current evidence about the 
presence and development of children’s ability to think about their own and others’ 
cognitive abilities (i.e., metacognition), which is a prerequisite to reliable 
performance on introspective memory tasks, such as the remember/know task. First, I 
will briefly discuss the construct of metacognition and John Flavell’s (1979) theory 
about components that comprise metacognition. Then, I will describe the 
development of metacognition generally and review in detail the current literature on 
the development of metamemory (the most relevant component of metacognition). I 
conclude by describing how the remember/know paradigm fits within Flavell’s 
framework and current research that has investigated children’s competence at 
completing this paradigm.  
Metacognition 
Reflecting upon cognition is vital because of the role it plays in supporting 
goal accomplishment before, during, and after a cognitive enterprise. Prior to 
engagement in a cognitive activity, a strategy can be selected based on prior 
effectiveness. During the cognitive activity progress can be monitored to decide 
whether the current strategy should be maintained or abandoned for an alternative 
approach. Following completion overall performance success can be evaluated to 
improve future cognitions.  For example, when trying to remember my grocery store 
list from memory I could order the items in a number of ways (e.g., the order I 
thought of them, alphabetical order, order of importance, or the store’s layout). I may 
initially decide to use the store’s layout to order the items. However, if I kept 




could abandon that strategy and instead try to rehearse items by order of importance. 
Then, based on how successful I am at remembering all of the items on my list, I may 
either keep using that strategy or choose an alternative strategy in the future.    
The ability to monitor and evaluate cognitive processes was coined 
metacognition by Flavell (1979). Flavell  (1979) suggested that four components 
underlie metacognitive monitoring, (a) knowledge about cognition, (b) metacognitive 
experiences, (c) goals, and (d) strategies that support the achievement of cognitive 
goals. Metacognitive knowledge includes information about the cognitive abilities of 
yourself and others (e.g., people can forget information they currently know), how 
task demands influence cognition (e.g., learning information for an exam is easier 
with more extensive prior knowledge), and the impact of strategies (e.g., rehearsal) on 
cognition. Metacognitive experiences refer to instances where one is consciously 
evaluating cognition. For example, determining whether you are prepared for an 
exam is an example of a metacognitive experience because you are assessing the 
quality of your knowledge in order to determine whether to feel confident or anxious 
about the impending exam. Goals and strategies can each be either cognitive or 
metacognitive. Considering the examination example, a cognitive goal is to obtain 
knowledge about a subject in order to pass the exam whereas a metacognitive goal is 
to assess your understanding of the concepts. A cognitive strategy improves progress 
toward the goal (e.g., making flash cards) whereas a metacognitive strategy evaluates 
the progress is being made toward that goal (e.g., flipping through flashcards and 




Flavell’s (1979) theory of metacognition applies to a wide variety of cognitive 
abilities.  Metacognition encompasses reflections about memory, decision making, 
reading and oral comprehension, attention, problem solving, affective processing, and 
social cognition (e.g., intention understanding). This list demonstrates that 
metacognition encompasses the ability to reflect upon personal cognitions (i.e., 
introspection) as well as the cognitions of others (i.e., mentalising). How 
introspection and mentalising are related remains a highly debated topic by 
researchers and philosophers (Carruthers, 2009; Frith & Happe, 1999; Nichols & 
Stich, 2003; Shanton & Goldman, 2010). Although some theorize that introspection 
and mentalising are two forms of one metacognitive ability (Frith & Happe, 1999), 
others contend introspection and mentalising are independent abilities (Nichols & 
Stich, 2003). Additional views suggest that the understanding of the self and others 
are closely related abilities. For example, Shanton and Goldman (2010) argue that 
mentalising arises from simulation of internal mental states, whereas Carruthers 
(2009) proposes that mentalising, which is used to understand how others are 
thinking, is used to understand personal cognitions. Because the goal of this review is 
to examine the development of metacognition, and, in particular introspection about 
memories, further discussion of these theories is beyond the scope of the current 
review. However, the multifaceted nature of metacognition has important 
implications for the development of metacognition because the subcomponents that 




Development of Metacognition 
The current literature on the development of metacognition shows that 
although some metacognitive abilities emerge as early as infancy, development 
continues throughout the school-aged years. For this section I discuss metacognitive 
abilities chronologically. Overall, evidence in infancy and toddlerhood shows that 
children have an early understanding others’ actions and desires. During the 
preschool years children’s linguistic utterances provide us a window into their 
understanding of their own and others’ cognitive abilities, which improve with age. 
During the school-aged years children demonstrate more advanced introspective and 
mentalising capacities such as greater metacognitive monitoring and perspective 
tasking abilities, respectively. 
The earliest metacognitive ability demonstrated is infants’ understanding the 
actions of others as intentional and goal-directed  (for a review see Woodward, 2009).  
For example, Woodward (1998) habituated 6- and 9-month-old infants to an 
experimenter reaching toward an object. During the test phase the experimenter either 
reached toward a novel object positioned in the same location as the habituated object 
or toward the habituated object in a novel location. Both 6- and 9-month-old infants 
looked longer when the researcher reached toward the novel object. This finding 
suggests that infants metacognitively represented the intentions of the experimenter’s 
reaching behavior and expected the experimenter to continue to reach for the same 
object.  
At approximately 18 months of age infants display an understanding that 




(Repacholi & Gopnik, 1997). For example, Rapacholi and Gopnik (1997) had 14- and 
18-month-old infants observe an experimenter make an expression of disgust when 
eating goldfish crackers and an expression of happiness when eating broccoli. Then, 
the experimenter asked the child for a snack while pushing a tray containing both the 
goldfish crackers and broccoli. If children understood that emotions are subjective 
and that the experimenter’s desire for broccoli may not match their own preference 
for the crackers, they should give the experimenter the broccoli. Eighteen-month-old 
children, but not 14-month-old children, showed this ability to reflect upon the 
experimenter’s preference.  
Children begin to describe their own emotional and cognitive states during the 
toddler and preschool years.  During the latter half of the second year children begin 
to use words such as “happy”, “sad”, “scared”, “mad”, and “tired” to describe their 
emotional experiences (Bretherton, McNew, & Beeghly-Smith, 1981). During the 
third year children begin to use mental verbs such as “think” and “know” (see Bartsch 
& Wellman, 1995 for a review of the development of how children discuss the 
content of their and others’ minds;  Brown & Dunn, 1991). However, one study 
suggests that children’s use of these mental terms does not imply complete 
understanding of them (Wellman & Johnson, 1979). Wellman and Johnson (1979) 
investigated 3- to 7-year-old children’s understanding of the terms “remember” and 
“forget” by reading stories that varied a character’s prior knowledge and current 
performance. Although both remembering and forgetting require prior knowledge 
(i.e., you can neither remember nor forget something you never learned), 




retrieval failure. For example, one story children were read was about a child who 
visited a friend’s house. He either observed which closet his coat was hung in or did 
not (i.e., leading to prior knowledge or not). Later, he went to retrieve his coat and 
looked either in the closet that did or did not house his coat (i.e., leading to 
performance success or not). Then, children were asked if the child remembered the 
location his coat was and if he forgot the location his coat was. Four-year-olds 
understood that retrieval success (i.e., choosing the correct closet) was necessary for 
remembering but only 5- and 7-year-old children understood that prior knowledge 
was also necessary for remembering and forgetting. These studies demonstrate how 
children’s linguistic utterances can be useful measures of children’s metacognitive 
awareness but that production does not necessarily reflect competency.  
Children also begin to demonstrate more advanced understanding of other 
people’s minds during the early childhood period.  This ability has primarily been 
assessed by children’s understanding of false beliefs. Three forms of false belief tasks 
are prevalently employed in the current literature, (a) location tasks, (b) content tasks, 
and (c) identity tasks. For example, during the Sally-Anne location task children see 
Sally place a doll in one location (e.g., under the bed) and leaves the room; Baron-
Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985). Then, Anne comes and moves the doll to another 
location (e.g., in the closet). To assess theory of mind, children are asked where Sally 
will look for the doll when she returns. If children are relying on theory of mind, they 
should report that Sally will search for the doll in the location she believes it to be in 
rather than the location where the doll has been moved. For content tasks, such as the 




inside (Hogrefe, Wimmer, & Perner, 1986). Then, they are shown that in reality that 
pencils, not Smarties, are contained within the box. Theory of mind is assessed by 
their ability to say that someone else will think there are Smarties, not pencils, inside 
of the box. Similarly, on the sponge-rock identity task children are shown an object 
that looks like a rock and asked what it is (Flavell, Flavell, & Green, 1983). Then, 
they are shown that it is actually a sponge. Theory of mind is assessed by their ability 
to say that another person thinks the object is a rock rather than a sponge. These tasks 
are all indicators of how well children are capable of reflecting upon mental content 
because the correct response requires that children use metacognition to think about 
how others would be thinking rather than relying on physical evidence or merely 
focusing on their own thoughts and knowledge.  A meta-analysis of 178 studies 
showed that, across task variations, children begin to reliably perform theory of mind 
tasks after 44 months of age (Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001). 
During middle childhood and adolescence introspection and mentalising 
capacities continue to be refined. For example, introspection improves through 
increased acknowledgement of thoughts as continuous and insuppressible (Flavell, 
Green, & Flavell, 1993, 1997, 2000; Flavell, Green, Flavell, Harris, & Astington, 
1995), monitoring whether current knowledge is sufficient for task demands 
(Markman, 1977), awareness and use of strategies  (e.g., Estes, 1998; Flavell, 
Friedrichs, & Hoyt, 1970), reading comprehension monitoring (Kolić-Vehovec, 
Bajšanski, & Zubković, 2010), and confidence-task accuracy correspondence (Weil et 
al., 2013). Mentalising also undergoes age-related change with older children 




thoughts and emotions of others; Eisenberg, Murphy, & Shepard, 1997), 
understanding of second-order mental states (e.g., Sarah thinks that Matt knows;  
Perner & Wimmer, 1985), perspective taking (for a review of the neural development 
of perspective taking see Crone & Dahl, 2012), and sarcasm comprehension (e.g., 
Glenwright & Pexman, 2010).  
These findings collectively demonstrate that the many facets of metacognition 
undergo a prolonged developmental trajectory. However, it is also important to note 
that metacognitive abilities are not flawless even in adults. Adults frequently 
misinterpret the cues of others, fail to engage in efficient study behaviors, and are 
unaware of strategies they use to solve problems. Flavell (1979, p. 910) 
acknowledged this failure when he noted that “I am absolutely convinced that there 
is, overall, far too little rather than enough or too much cognitive monitoring in this 
world. This is true for adults as well as children, but it is especially true for children.” 
Development of Metamemory 
Four decades ago Flavell asked the question “what is memory development 
the development of (1971, p. 272)?” His response was that memory development is 
primarily the development of metamemory, the “intelligent structuring and storage of 
input, of intelligent search and retrieval operations, and of intelligent monitoring and 
knowledge of these storage and retrieval operations” (Flavell, 1971, p. 277). The 
focus of this section is on the development of metamemory from early childhood 
throughout adulthood. First, I review evidence regarding children’s knowledge about 
memory. For example, what do children know about memory properties (e.g., it is 




now you will remember later), differences in memory ability across individuals, the 
influence of task demands on memory performance (e.g., it is easier to remember a 
shorter versus a longer list of items), and the efficacy of various memorization 
strategies? Then, because strategy knowledge is not synonymous with strategy use, I 
discuss the effective use of memorization strategies across development. I next 
describe children’s ability to reflect upon the contents of their memories and, when 
evidence is available, use that introspection to control their behavior. For example, I 
consider how well children’s judgments about confidence align with encoding 
experiences and whether these judgments influence trial skipping and subjective 
judgments of memory. I conclude by discussing, based on the literature reviewed, 
how reliable children may be at performing introspective memory tasks, such as the 
remember/know task, which are widely utilized to examine the subjective state of 
remembering in adults. This question is of importance because, if children can 
reliably perform these types of tasks, great advances may be made toward 
understanding the lifespan development of memory as well as the role of subjective 
remembering in the development of the self, understanding of  others, processing of 
previously experienced events, and future imagination (e.g., Buckner & Carroll, 
2007; Rajaram & Roediger, 1997; Schacter et al., 2007). 
Knowledge about Metamemory 
Metacognitive knowledge refers to children’s understanding of factors that 
influence memory. Although not widely discussed, most researchers are in agreement 
that this knowledge is acquired through children’s personal experiences with memory 




from such experiences; Flavell, 1979; Karably & Zabrucky, 2009; Moynahan, 1973). 
Some support for this notion comes from a study finding that children who performed 
a categorization memory task prior to predicting the effect of categorization on 
memory were more likely to say that categorization improves memory than children 
who performed the prediction task first (Moynahan, 1973). However, it is also 
possible that children’s knowledge about memory could come from other people. For 
example, children could learn that the period of time between encoding and retrieval 
influences retrieval probability from parents making statements such as “Take your 
truck to your room right now. If you wait, you might forget.” Many of the studies 
below focus not on how metamemory knowledge is acquired but rather the content of 
that knowledge. Three categories of metamemory knowledge are discussed:  person-
oriented, task-oriented, and strategy-oriented. 
Person-oriented metamemory knowledge. Person-oriented metacognitive 
knowledge includes information about attributes internal to individuals that influence 
memory performance. The domain of person-oriented metacognitive knowledge can 
be further separated into factors that influence memory within an individual person 
(i.e., intra-individual differences), differences across individuals (i.e., inter-individual 
differences), and general properties of memory  
Intra-individual differences. Research on children’s understanding of intra-
individual factors suggests that children develop an understanding that emotions, 
attentional states, and goals influence memory early in development. Preschool-aged 
children have been shown to understand that some emotions and mood states 




children expected that they and others would remember more information when 
happy versus sad and when alert versus tired (Hayes et al., 1987). However, they did 
not predict differences in memory performance when someone was fearful versus 
calm. Whereas even kindergarteners knew that someone is more likely to remember 
information if inherently interested in it, they did not understand that cognitive goals 
and attention would influence memory performance until 2nd grade (Miller & Weiss, 
1982). Kindergarten, 2nd grade, 5th grade, and adult participants expected people to be 
more likely to remember information when their interest is high than when it is low 
(Miller & Weiss, 1982). However, only 2nd graders, 5th graders, and adults recognized 
that attentiveness (i.e., the degree to which thoughts were focused on the task versus 
the room contents) and goals (i.e., the degree to which the child’s goal is to complete 
the memory task versus listen to what is occurring in the next room) influence 
subsequent memory performance.  
Inter-individual differences. Studies on inter-individual differences have 
examined children’s understanding of relevant (i.e., age, individual differences) and 
irrelevant (e.g., clothing) factors. The most widely investigated inter-individual factor 
is age (Kreutzer, Leonard, Flavell, & Hagen, 1975; Miller & Weiss, 1982; Schneider 
& Pressley, 1997; Wellman, 1977b; Yussen & Bird, 1979). Collectively, these studies 
show that whereas preschool children do not understand that older people are more 
likely to remember information, school-aged children do, with the ability becoming 
more reliable between 4 and 6 years of age. For example, whereas in one study only 
33% of 4-year-old children indicated that age would influence memory performance 




kindergarteners considered age as an important indicator of memory (Miller & Weiss, 
1982; Wellman, 1977b). Furthermore, children’s explanations about memory suggest 
that they are aware that age influences memory and that overall memory accuracy 
across individuals differs (e.g., one child stated “Sometimes I remember better than 
them and sometimes they remember better than I–I’ve got one older friend and that’s 
all–he’d probably remember more than me” and another said “Well, some of my 
friends would get about all of them, some of them wouldn’t get any, and some would 
get about the same as me”; Kreutzer et al., 1975, p. 6). 
 As important as it is for children to understand factors that do influence 
memory performance, it is equally important for them to acknowledge factors that are 
unrelated to memory. Knowledge of irrelevant inter-individual factors has 
predominantly been studied in 3- to 5-year-old children (Hayes et al., 1987; see 
Schneider & Pressley, 1997 for a discussion of Munich Longitudinal Study findings; 
Wellman, 1977b). These studies show that with age children are less likely to endorse 
weight (Hayes et al., 1987; Wellman, 1977b), hair color (Schneider & Pressley, 1997; 
Wellman 1977), and clothing (Wellman, 1977b) as factors that influence memory 
performance. In summary, throughout early childhood there is a significant increase 
in children’s ability to acknowledge valid and ignore irrelevant sources of inter-
individual differences in memory performance.  
General knowledge about memory. As children utilize their memory 
capacities and observe other’s engaging in memory-related activities, they gradually 
acquire general knowledge about the form and function of memory. For example, 




understanding (attending, remembering, communicating, problem solving, etc.). You 
may not understand some person or thing you hear, see, or read about if you do not 
attend closely, and also, sometimes, even if you do attend closely” (p. 907). Flavell’s 
contemporaries and successors agreed that children’s understanding of memory is an 
interesting research topic and have investigated children’s understanding of 
remembering, forgetting, and memory errors. As such, the focus of this section is on 
children’s developing knowledge about different memory states, principles of 
memory, and memory errors. 
Differentiating memory states. During their third year children begin to use 
terms related to memory such as “remember” and “forget” (Limber, 1973). Four-
year-old children appropriately understand the term “forget” refers to an absence of 
memory (Macnamara, Baker, & Olson, 1976). Macnamara and colleagues (1976) 
showed that 4-year-old children expected a friend in a narrative to be disappointed 
when her friend “forgot” to bring a toy along with her. Further, children expected that 
if she “forgot” the toy it would not be with her. Despite this early understanding, 
more complete knowledge of the meaning of the terms “remember” and “forget” is 
not obtained until the elementary school years. For example, Wellman and Johnson 
(1979) found that children did not fully appreciate that prior knowledge is necessary 
for the use of the terms “remember” and “forget” until they were 5- to 7-years-old 
(e.g., John did not know that his dad went to the grocery store he could neither 
remember nor forget that his father was there).  
Throughout early childhood school children also develop an understanding of 




of development when learning the difference between “know” and “guess” (Johnson 
& Wellman, 1980; Miscione, Marvin, O’Brien, & Greenberg, 1978). Initially children 
do not conceptualize the difference between these terms. Following this stage 
children focus on the outcome of the action to determine whether the appropriate 
mental state is “know” or “guess” (i.e., if correct, they “knew” the response but if 
incorrect it was a “guess”). Then, children intermittently  use the term guess 
accurately, and, eventually, demonstrate an adult-like understanding of their meaning 
(Johnson & Wellman, 1980; Miscione et al., 1978). Miscione and colleagues (1978) 
found substantial variability within age groups in the category of responses shown by 
3- to 7-year-old children. However, an overall pattern of age-related improvements 
emerged.  
A more recent study by Cherney (2003) showed that children’s use of mental 
terms increasingly corresponds to their mental states. For example, 3- and 5-year-old 
children participated in a play-like task during which they had to assist an 
experimenter place animals back into their respective cages. Children’s utterances of 
mental terms and accuracy for animal-cage placement were coded for a match 
between the mental state and objective memory performance. For example, the use of 
the term “know” and accurate cage placement as well as “forget” and inaccurate cage 
placement would each be coded as a match. The results showed age-related increases 
in performance matching with 45% of the 3-year-olds and 75% of the 5-year-olds 
demonstrating matching responses. These studies show that with age children 





Principles of memory. In addition to an increased understanding and 
application of mental terms, the metamemory literature shows that children 
increasingly understand the processes of forgetting and conditions that facilitate 
learning. During the elementary school years children increasingly acknowledge that 
they can be forgetful  and that they are more likely over time to remember gist (i.e., 
conceptually-consistent) versus verbatim (i.e., precise)  information  (Kreutzer et al., 
1975). For example, after first hearing the story of Little Red Riding Hood children 
may remember that she explicitly comments on the size of her grandmother’s ears, 
eyes, and hands. However, with time, they may forget that verbatim information and 
rather remember that she comments on the size of her grandmother’s physical 
features. Children also know that it is easier for someone who has been exposed to 
information previously to re-learn it than it is for someone who is first being 
introduced. With age, children are better able to explain why this occurs (e.g., one 
child stated “because as soon as he heard the names, they would probably all come 
back to him; Kreutzer et al., 1975, p. 9)”  
Memory errors. Children’s understanding of two forms of memory errors, 
interference and suggestibility, develops during the elementary school years. 
Retroactive interference refers to novel information disrupting the maintenance of 
previously acquired information. For example, remembering the names of students 
from previous semesters is more difficult when a new semester begins. Proactive 
interference refers to prior information making it more challenging to learn present 
information. For example, one semester I had a hard time learning a student’s name 




understanding of interference has been assessed by their responses to question about 
narratives (Kreutzer et al., 1975; O’Sullivan, Howe, & Marche, 1996). In one study 
preschoolers, 1st graders, and 3rd graders were read stories about children who went to 
a party and then had a friend come over to play (O’Sullivan et al., 1996). The 1st and 
3rd graders but not the preschoolers expected the child to misremember the friend who 
came over to play as attending the birthday party. On a slightly more complex task, 
Kretuzer and colleagues (1975) demonstrated that that 3rd and 5th grade children but 
not kindergarten or 1st grade children expected someone to experience retroactive 
interference.  Children were asked whether a child who met 15 children at two events 
would have better or worse memory for the names of the children than a child who 
met 8 children at one event and went home. Only 3rd and 5th graders expected poorer 
memory in the child who learned more names at two events. To my knowledge no 
studies have investigated children’s understanding of proactive interference. 
Suggestibility refers to memory errors that are caused by information being 
introduced by a third party. Developmental research shows that children’s awareness 
of suggestibility shows significant development during middle childhood (London, 
Bruck, Poole, & Melnyk, 2011; O’Sullivan et al., 1996). During a narrative task 3rd 
graders but not preschoolers or 1st graders expected a child’s memory to be impacted 
by the mother having a false memory of the event (O’Sullivan et al., 1996). More 
recently, London and colleagues (2011) showed video clips of a child interacting with 
a fireman and his babysitter to 6- to 13-year-old children. During the video the 
fireman, who had previously left his hat with Jamie, returned to retrieve his hat while 




repeatedly asked whether the fireman had hit Jamie and his babysitter. Then, Jamie 
tells his mother that he was hit by the fireman. Understanding of suggestibility was 
assessed by asking participants “Why did Jamie tell the first adult that there was no 
hitting but then told the second adult that there was hitting (London et al., 2011, p. 
150)?” The results showed significant and gradual age-related improvement in 
children’s ability to identify suggestibility as the source of the error between 6 and 13 
years of age with older participants showing performance at ceiling levels.  
In conclusion, research shows that children’s metamemory knowledge about 
person-oriented information undergoes significant development during childhood for 
the domains of intra-individual differences, inter-individual differences, and general 
knowledge about the function of memory. Most studies show substantial age-related 
differences in metamemory knowledge about person-oriented variables between 3 
and 8 years of age. Next, I consider the development of understanding of task-related 
factors that can influence memory performance. 
Task-oriented metamemory knowledge. Task-oriented metamemory 
knowledge refers to one’s understanding of features of the encoding episode, retrieval 
conditions, or characteristics of the to-be-remembered information that influence 
subsequent retrieval. Multiple studies have examined the development of children’s 
understanding of how these factors influence memory performance. These 
investigations collectively suggest that although children understand some task 
factors that influence memory relatively early in development understanding of other 




Encoding conditions. Researchers have examined whether children 
understand the influence of three encoding conditions on memory performance: 
environmental distractions, study time, and contextualization. Within the domain of 
task-oriented metamemory knowledge, one of the first pieces of knowledge that 
children acquire is that memory encoding is compromised when information is 
learned in a noisy environment (Hayes et al., 1987; Miller & Weiss, 1982; Wellman, 
1977b; Yussen & Bird, 1979). For example, Hayes and colleagues (1987) found that 
even 3- to 5-year-old children expected people to remember more when they were in 
a quiet versus a noisy room. Similarly, young children also understand that studying 
items for a longer period of time improves memory performance (Kreutzer et al., 
1975; Yussen & Bird, 1979).  Understanding of study duration as a factor that 
influences memory increases between 4 and 6 years of age (Yussen & Bird, 1979) but 
remains stable throughout the elementary school years (Kreutzer et al., 1975). 
Children also develop an understanding that information is more easily encoded when 
it is contextualized (Kreutzer et al., 1975). For example, 3rd and 5th graders were more 
likely than kindergarten and 1st graders to indicate that learning words within the 
context of a story would be easier than memorizing a list of words. 
Retrieval conditions. Children also acquire an understanding that the duration 
of time between encoding and retrieval influences memory performance (Kreutzer et 
al., 1975; Lyon & Flavell, 1993). Lyon and Flavell (1993) asked 3- and 4-year-old 
children (a) whether characters who waited shorter versus longer periods of time 
between encoding and retrieval would be more likely to remember an object’s 




time ago  would be more likely to be forgotten. Only 4-year-old children expected 
characters who viewed objects a longer time ago to have poorer memory for the 
object’s location and for objects viewed longer ago to be forgotten while those 
viewed sooner ago remembered. Similarly, Kreutzer and colleagues (1975) 
demonstrated that, although the majority of kindergarten through 5th grade students 
indicated that a memorized phone number needed should be used immediately rather 
than after a delay, the frequency of this response increased with age.  
 Features of to-be-remembered items. In addition to children developing an 
understanding about factors that influence encoding and retrieval processes, children 
also learn that features of the to-be-remembered information influences memorability. 
During the preschool years children increasingly learn that it is more challenging to 
remember a larger number of items (Hayes et al., 1987; Wellman, 1977b; Yussen & 
Bird, 1979). Furthermore, some information is more easily recalled than other 
information. For example, 3rd but not 1st graders understand that details central to a 
story (e.g., Little Red Riding Hood’s grandmother was replaced by a wolf) are more 
likely to be recalled than peripheral details (e.g., her grandmother was wearing a blue 
dress; O’Sullivan et al., 1996). Similarly, 3rd and 5th grade students but not 1st grade 
students understand that opposite pairs (e.g., boy-girl) are more easily recalled than 
arbitrarily associated pairs (e.g., Mary-walks) and that categorized information is 
easier to remember than non-categorized information (Kreutzer et al., 1975; 
Moynahan, 1973).  
Recency, saliency, and plausibility also influence the memorability of events 




and Alexander (2004) showed that children as young as 5-years-old expected events 
high in saliency (e.g., visiting the Grand Canyon) to be more memorable than events 
low in saliency (e.g., taking a craft class during the summer). However, only 9-year-
olds and adults expected heightened memory for recent and low-plausible (e.g., 
meeting your favorite celebrity) events. Friedman (2007) recently provided additional 
evidence for the prolonged developmental trajectory of  metamemory for temporal 
scale. Kindergarteners, in contrast to 2nd graders, 4th graders, 6th graders, and adults, 
failed to expect a decrement in memory for the time of day, day of the week, and 
month an event occurred.  These results collectively suggest that although preschool-
aged children have an elementary understanding of task-related factors that influence 
memory performance, their understanding of some of these elements (i.e., recency) 
continues to develop throughout middle childhood.  
Strategy-oriented metamemory knowledge. The third component of 
metacognitive knowledge discussed by Flavell (1979) was knowledge about which 
strategies were optimal for meeting cognitive goals. This body of work began in the 
1970s but was widely expanded during the 1980s by developmental and educational 
psychologists. Overall, children demonstrate age-related differences in (a) identifying 
which strategy they used to solve a task, (b) understanding why particular strategies 
are beneficial and (c) recognizing the most optimal strategy. 
Strategy identification.Older children are more likely than younger children 
to state that they used a strategy while performing a task (Mathews & Fozard, 1970). 
For example, Mathews and Fozzard (1970) found that 25%, 56%, and 95% of 5-, 7-, 




memory task. This pattern may either emerge either because younger children are not 
employing strategies or because they do not have metacognitive access to which 
strategies they used. A study by Bjorkland and Zeman (1982) suggests the latter.  
This study found that task performance suggested that 1st, 3rd, and 5th graders’ all used 
a clustering strategy to remember the names of children in their class (e.g., by sex). 
However, 5th graders were significantly more likely to metacognitively identify this 
as the strategy used to recall names than the younger children (Bjorklund & Zeman, 
1982). 
Understanding why strategies are effective. With age children also have more 
accurate expectations of strategy effectiveness and better explanations for why 
strategies are effective (Miller & Weiss, 1982; Moynahan, 1973). For instance, when 
1st, 3rd, and 5th graders were asked “Why is it easier to remember things when there 
are all the same kinds of things together? (Moynahan, 1973, p. 240)”, 1st graders were 
less capable of providing comprehensive explanations than 5th graders.  A typical 1st 
grader’s response was non-specific (e.g., “It was easier to say”) whereas a 5th grader’s 
response specifically referenced categories or associations as strengthening memory 
traces and aiding recall (e.g., “Because you can remember what group they are in, and 
it’s easier to figure out what it is, like if you remember that it was a group of animals 
you wouldn’t say kitchen sink”; Moynahan, 1973, p. 243-244).  
Similarly, age-related differences are present in children’s ability to 
understand components of strategies that improve performance. For example, leaving 
a reminder is potentially a good strategy for remembering to perform an act in the 




the location of an object (e.g., drawing a map to remember where you hid items for a 
scavenger hunt). However, if your reminder is insufficient (e.g., you wrote yourself a 
note saying “do something at 12pm” or a map without landmarks), you will burn your 
cookies and fail to find all of your hidden items during the scavenger hunt. Whereas 
kindergarten and 1st grade children acknowledged that cues should be related to the 
to-be-remembered information, visible, and available, 3rd grade children noted that 
they must also be unambiguous and noticeable, and only adults required that cues be 
sufficiently detailed (Beal, 1985).  
 Identifying the optimal strategy. In addition to understanding why strategies 
are effective, children must learn to prefer the most efficient strategy and determine 
which strategies are optimal for different tasks. Research suggests that this ability 
emerges later in the elementary school years and continues to develop into 
adolescence (Kreutzer et al., 1975; Lovett & Flavell, 1990; Schneider, 1986; Waters, 
1982). Children initially demonstrate wide inter-individual variability in strategy 
preference but with age children converge to favor the optimal strategy.  For example, 
Kreutzer and colleagues (1975) showed children cards that could be sorted into three 
categories (i.e., body parts, foods, and articles of clothing) and asked them what 
strategy they would use in order to remember the items. Responses were split into the 
following strategy categories: Categorization, Association, Rehearsal, External 
Storage, Looking, Random Rearrangement, and No Strategy. Whereas 
kindergarteners differed widely in their responses with association being the most 
common response (e.g., “a sock goes on your foot”, Kreutzer et al., 1975, p. 21), 72% 




graders’ strategy preferences of are more similar to adults than are 2nd graders’. 
Demonstrating the prolonged developmental trajectory of optimal strategy selection, 
Waters (1982) found differences in strategy use between 8th and 10th graders. These 
studies demonstrate children’s selection of strategies for a given task. However, 
different strategies are required for different cognitive tasks. For example, whereas 
rehearsal is a good strategy for preparing for a memory task, definition learning 
would be more beneficial than rehearsal for a reading comprehension task. Toward 
the end of elementary school, children begin to understand this principle.  Third 
graders and adults are better at selecting strategies that would be useful for 
performing memory and comprehension tasks than 1st graders (Lovett & Flavell, 
1990). 
In conclusion, throughout the elementary school years children’s knowledge 
about the impact of strategies on memory substantially increases. They are better able 
to identify strategies that they used to complete a task, describe these strategies in 
detail, and understand the effectiveness of strategies in a variety of situations. 
Because metamemory knowledge may precede or follow the children’s application of 
strategies, the next section focuses on how efficiently children apply of strategies to 
complete memory tasks.  
Employment of strategies to improve memory 
Studies that have been conducted to assess children’s application of strategies 
to improve memory performance show that (a) early in childhood children begin 




and their ability to learn strategies from others, and (c) some of these age-related 
improvements in strategy application are due to abilities other than metamemory.  
 Multiple studies show that even young children apply some basic strategies to 
improve their memory performance. Elementary school children alter study behavior 
based on item relatedness (Dufrense & Kobasigawa, 1989), item familiarity 
(Kobasigawa & Metcalf-Haggert, 1993), and degree of prior learning (Masur, 
McIntyre, & Flavell, 1973). Specifically, children spend a longer period of time 
studying unrelated items than related items, unfamiliar than familiar items, and 
poorly-learned items than well-learned items. Children also differ their study duration 
based on task demands (Geis & Lange, 1976; Salatas & Flavell, 1976). For example, 
1st grade children engage in increased categorization when told to “remember” versus 
“look” at items (Salatas & Flavell, 1976). Furthermore, they can use metacognitive 
knowledge about strategy effectiveness to influence their own behavior. Preschoolers 
both state that someone who is alert is better able to remember information than 
someone who is tired and apply this knowledge to their own behavior by delaying 
studying when tired (Hayes et al., 1987). To assess whether children would modulate 
their own behavior, one study had 3- to 5-year-old participate in feeding the class 
pigeon (Hayes et al., 1987). Prior to feeding the pigeon, children either engaged in 
high or low fatiguing activities.  Children in the high-fatigue condition climbed four 
flights of stairs and carried a full bucket whereas children in the low-fatigue condition 
carried an empty bucket and helped clean the pigeon’s cage. Then, all children were 
asked if they would like to learn the rules for a new game now or later. Children in 




Thus, children were capable of stating that someone who is tired is more likely to 
perform worse on a memory task than someone who is alert and deciding to delay 
their own learning when they are tired. This finding could be explained in at least two 
ways: a) children’s metacognitive evaluation of their mental state led to their decision 
to delay learning or b) when children are tired, they delay learning.  
 Multiple age-related differences are present in the spontaneous application of 
strategies to improve memory performance. Older children are more likely to engage 
in the following behaviors than younger children: planful encoding (e.g., associating 
studied stimuli with related cues; Eskritt & Lee, 2002; Ritter, 1978; Schneider & 
Sodian, 1988), elaborative encoding (e.g., naming or contextualizing information “I 
put the dancer into the house with the comb because she needs to comb her hair very 
often”; Baker-Ward, Ornstein, & Holden, 1984; Schneider & Sodian, 1988, p. 217; 
Waters, 1982), and prolonged encoding of challenging versus easily acquired 
information (Dufresne & Kobasigawa, 1989; Lockl & Schneider, 2004). Waters 
(1982) demonstrated that the use of elaborative strategies continues to increase during 
adolescence with 8th graders less frequently employing elaboration than 10th graders. 
Furthermore, even when 8th graders utilized the elaborative strategy they were less 
efficient than 10th graders remembering 44% of the word pairs in comparison to the 
61% remembered by 10th graders.  
 Although some increase in strategy use may be attributed to age-related 
improvements in metamemory, developmental improvements in general knowledge 
and working memory also contribute to increased memory performance. For example, 




Older children’s notes were more beneficial for task performance because they were 
better able to identify the important information while studying in comparison to 
younger children. Similarly, whereas 2nd graders were more likely to categorize 
strongly related items, 4th graders were equally as likely to categorize items that were 
strongly or weakly associated (Schneider, 1986).    
In summary, children’s knowledge about person, task, and strategy-oriented 
variables that influence memory emerges during the preschool years and develops 
significantly during the elementary school years. Generally, knowledge about and 
utilization of efficient strategies shows the longest developmental trajectory 
extending well into adolescence. Researchers speculate that children predominantly 
acquire metamemory knowledge by introspecting upon their own memory 
experiences memory (Flavell, 1979; Karably & Zabrucky, 2009; Moynahan, 1973). In 
order for this to be true, children must be able to accurately introspect about the 
contents of their memory. Thus, I turn my focus to the current literature on children’s 
memory introspection. 
Memory introspection 
Whereas the majority of studies on metacognitive knowledge were conducted 
in the 1970s and 1980s, current research has focused on the development of memory 
introspection (e.g., for reviews see Ghetti, Hembacher, & Coughlin, 2013; Perner et 
al., 2007). This shift is related to a number of factors including interests in (a) using 
methods that bridge developmental and adult work (e.g., Ghetti & Angelini, 2008), 
(b) investigating how well children metacognitively control their behaviors (e.g., are 




answer? Ghetti et al., 2013), and (c) determining the developmental trajectory of 
autobiographical remembering (i.e., the subjective state associating personal 
experience with retrieved memories; Perner et al., 2007).  
Multiple bodies of work have assessed children’s abilities to predict and 
introspect about the contents of their memory. I begin this section by describing 
studies investigating children’s predictions of memory performance. Children are 
overall pretty poor at predicting future memory performance, particularly memory 
recall. However, children are much better at making introspective judgments about 
memory performance including judgments of learning (i.e., particularly when these 
judgments are delayed), feelings of knowing, and confidence ratings. I conclude by 
describing two studies that have empirically examined whether children are capable 
of reliably performing the remember/know task.  
Memory predictions.Young children are notorious for overestimating their 
cognitive abilities (for review see Bjorklund, Periss, & Causey, 2009), and many 
systematic laboratory investigations have assessed children’s ability to predict 
subsequent memory performance. Whereas no age-related improvements are present 
in predicting recognition performance across the elementary school years (Yussen & 
Berman, 1981),  age-related differences are present in children’s prediction of 
memory recall (Flavell et al., 1970; Lipko, Dunlosky, & Merriman, 2009). Children’s 
overestimations of subsequent recall are present regardless of whether they are 
predicting their own behavior or the behavior of someone else and persist even after 
experiencing poor performance (Lipko et al., 2009). For example, Lipko and 




many they would subsequently be able to recall.  Children consistently over predicted 
the number they would remember as well as how many another person would 
remember. Furthermore, even though children were relatively accurate at assessing 
how they performed on previous trials, across trials they continued to over predict the 
number of items they were capable of remembering. However, with age, children 
become more accurate at predicting the number of items they would subsequently 
recall (Flavell et al., 1970; Yussen & Berman, 1981).  
Younger children’s poor performance on prediction tasks could be due to a 
number of factors. First, overestimation could be due to a lack of metamemory 
experiences upon which to base the prediction. As argued by Kail (1990), children’s 
propensity to overestimate memory performance could also be due to a lack of 
knowledge about factors that influence memory (i.e., such as person, task, or strategy 
variables discussed above). Another possibility is that even when children have 
experience with memory tasks and knowledge about factors that influence memory, 
they might not apply that knowledge to predict future performance.  
Some researchers have speculated that skill overestimation may actually be 
beneficial early in development. For example, overestimation may facilitate ability 
acquisition by leading children to persist at challenging tasks (e.g., Bjorklund & 
Green, 1992; Bjorklund et al., 2009). For example, kindergarten to fifth grade 
children who showed the most skill overestimation performed better on a recall task 
across trials than children who more accurately judged their skills (Shin, Bjorklund, 
& Beck, 2007).  However, it is also possible to view overestimation as a potential 




knowledge about a subject. If one of them overestimates his knowledge and spends 
less time studying for a test whereas the other more accurately estimates his 
knowledge and spends more time studying, the latter will likely perform remember 
more content information the day of the test. Therefore, overestimation may be 
viewed either positively or negatively depending on the particular stage of 
development and task of interest. 
Judgments of learning.A similar line of work has investigated children’s 
judgments about how well they have learned material. Judgments of learning (JOLs) 
are obtained shortly after the encoding episode and require participants to reflect upon 
how likely they are to subsequently remember learned information. Developmental 
research suggests that, although age-related differences are present in the accuracy of 
JOLs, children as young as preschool-aged are capable of reflecting upon the contents 
of their memory and use the many of the same cues as adults when making JOLs 
(Flavell et al., 1970; Koriat, Ackerman, Lockl, & Schneider, 2009; Koriat & Shitzer-
Reichert, 2002; Lipowski, Merriman, & Dunlosky, 2013; Roebers, von der Linden, 
Schneider, & Howie, 2007; Schneider, Visé, Lockl, & Nelson, 2000).  
The earliest study of children’s ability to judge how well they learned 
information was conducted by Flavell and his colleagues (1970). Experimenters 
asked preschool through 4th grade children to learn three sets of pictures until they 
were capable of remembering them all. The researchers found improvements in 
children’s ability to accurately judge their learning. Whereas all 4th graders 
remembered all of the pictures for two or three of the sets, 78% of preschoolers and 




recalled all items for one set. Although this study suggests age-related differences in 
JOLs, it is not clear why this result emerged. Differences between older and young 
children could have occurred because older children (a) are better at recall tasks, (b) 
more adequately evaluate the accuracy of their memories, (c) better understand the 
influence of study behavior on memory performance, or (d) are more motivated to 
study items in accordance with the experimenter’s instructions.  More recent studies 
have focused on assessing whether factors that influence JOLs in adults also do so in 
children.   
Studies show that children’s JOLs are affected by the duration of time that has 
elapsed since encoding, item repetition, the content of the information, and the 
amount of time participants study items (Koriat & Shitzer-Reichert, 2002; Koriat et 
al., 2009; Lipowski et al., 2013;  Roebers et al., 2007; Schneider et al., 2000). 
Research in adults shows that JOLs more accurately predict performance when they 
are taken following a delay rather when they immediately follow encoding (Nelson & 
Dunlosky, 1991). Specifically, the gamma correlation (i.e., which ranges from -1.0 to 
1.0 with 1.0 reflecting perfect correspondence between JOLs and memory 
performance) between JOLs and memory recall increases from .38 for immediate 
JOLs to .90 for delayed JOLs. Correspondence between immediate JOLs and recall 
performance is hypothesized to be lower because participants are initially over-
confident in their ability to subsequently remember items. JOLs made directly after 
the item is encoded are affected by representations of the item in both short-term and 
long-term memory. In contrast, if JOLs are made after a delay, the short-term 




and recall performance is higher because both measures are based solely on long-term 
memory traces.  
Two developmental studies have demonstrated that children’s JOLs are also 
more accurate when obtained following a delay versus immediately after encoding 
(i.e., the delayed-JOL effect; cf. Roebers et al., 2007; Lipowski et al., 2013; 
Schneider et al., 2000). The developmental assessment of JOLs began with Schneider 
and colleagues’ (2000) assessment of school-aged children. Kindergarten, 2nd grade, 
and 4th grade students all demonstrated higher JOL-task performance correspondence 
when JOLs were obtained after a delay versus immediately after item encoding. 
Recently, Lipowski and colleagues (2013) assessed whether children as young as 
preschool-aged are capable of providing reliable JOLs. Preschool and 3rd grade 
children learned novel animal names and judged whether they would remember the 
names in the future. The number of children who expected to remember all of the 
animal names was larger when JOLs were made immediately after learning (i.e., 24 
out of 29 preschoolers) than when they were made after a delay (i.e., 14 
preschoolers). The gamma correlation for delayed JOLs and animal name recall was 
.42 for preschoolers and .96 for 3rd graders. The researchers argued that, although 
preschoolers’ correlation was not significantly above zero, it was sufficiently high 
enough to suggest that even preschoolers can provide reliable assessments of their 
learning when these judgments are delayed.  
In contrast to the studies just described, Roebers and colleagues (2007) failed 
to find differences in relations between JOLs and task performance when JOLs were 




this study, 8-year-olds, 10-year-olds, and adults watched a video. Either immediately 
after the video (i.e., immediate JOL condition) or the next day (i.e., delayed JOL 
condition) they were asked whether they would subsequently remember specific 
details about the video (e.g., “When the children come into the kitchen, what is the 
mother doing?” Roebers et al., 2007, p. 121). The delayed-JOL effect was likely not 
found in this study due to the timing of when the JOLs were acquired.  Immediate 
JOLs were obtained after the entire video was watched. In the studies that found the 
delayed-JOL effect in children (i.e., Lipowski et al., 2013; Schneider et al., 2000) 
immediate JOLs were taken after each item was encoded whereas delayed JOLs were 
taken after all items had been encoded. Thus, the timing of the immediate JOLs in the 
study by Roebers and colleagues (2007) was similar to the delayed JOLs in the 
previous developmental studies (Lipowski et al., 2013; Schneider et al., 2000). This 
explanation is consistent with Nelson and Dunlosky’s (1991) theory that immediate 
JOLs are overconfident because they rely on representations from long and short-term 
memory whereas delayed JOLs are more accurate because they merely rely on long-
term memory. In the study by Roebers and colleagues (2007) the items would no 
longer have been active in short-term memory when participants made judgments 
after watching the entire movie.   
One study demonstrated that children’s JOLs are sensitive to item repetition 
(Koriat & Shitzer-Reichert, 2002). Researchers presented 2nd and 4th grade students 
with four repetitions of word pairs. Following the presentation of each word pair, 
children provided a JOL on a 5-point scale ranging from the child having “no chance 




(Koriat & Shitzer-Reichert, 2002, p. 7).”  Both 2nd and 4th graders provided more 
confident JOLs across item repetitions. Furthermore, 2nd and 4th graders both 
decreased their JOLs for hard items from the first to the second presentation. This 
finding strands in contrast to the study of memory prediction described above which 
showed that preschool children did not adjust their predictions of the number items 
they would subsequently recall with practice (Lipko et al., 2009). The difference in 
findings between these two studies may be explained by differences in methodology; 
in one case children were asked to predict future memory recall whereas in the other 
they were required to judge whether individual items would be subsequently 
remembered. 
Characteristics of stimuli also influence how well they are learned, and two 
studies suggest that children’s JOLs are influenced by this factor. First through 4th 
graders all provide higher JOLs for more easily remembered word pairs in contrast to 
harder word pairs (Koriat & Shitzer-Reichert, 2002; Lockl & Schneider, 2002). 
However, age-related differences in JOLs were present in Koriat and Shitzer-
Reichert’s (2002) study. During the first block, 2nd and 4th graders provided similar 
JOLs for easy word pairs. The JOLs provided by 2nd graders were higher than those 
of 4th graders for harder word pairs suggesting that their learning expectations were 
more overconfident.  
 Lastly, the amount of time an item needs to be studied can be used as an 
indicator of how likely that item will be remembered in the future (Koriat et al., 2009; 
Son & Metcalfe, 2000). Specifically, items that are studied for a shorter period of 




readily remembered than items that must be studied for longer durations. Current 
research suggests that during the elementary school years children develop an 
understanding of this concept. Koriat and colleagues (2009) found that the longer 3rd 
to 6th grade students studied the lower their JOLs. In contrast, 1st and 2nd grade 
students’ JOLs were not influenced by study duration.  
Collectively, these studies show that school-aged children are able to judge how well 
they have learned information. Their JOLs reliably predict subsequent memory recall 
and are influenced by the factors of timing, repetition, and stimulus characteristics in 
the same way as adults. Similar to adults, children’s JOLs were better when they were 
made after a delay. This may explain why when introspective reports are taken at 
retrieval (i.e., feeling-of-knowing judgments, confidence judgments, and the 
remember/know judgments), as outlined below, children are relatively accurate.   
Feelings-of-knowing. Similar to memory predictions and JOLs, feeling-of-
knowing (FOK) judgments are subjective assessments about whether information will 
be retrievable later.  Typically, participants engage in a free-recall task and FOKs are 
obtained following a failed recall attempt by asking participants if they will later 
recognize the information they were not able to freely recall. For example, one study 
examined FOKs in young 4- and 5-year-old children by showing them faces of people 
who varied in familiarity (Cultice, Somerville, & Wellman, 1983). Researchers 
initially asked the child to try and recall each person’s name. Then, for people whose 
names they could not recall, feelings of knowing were indexed by children’s response 
to the following question: “If I told you a lot of names, do you think you would 




demonstrated an ability to monitor the content of their memories by reporting feeling 
of knowing judgments when they were capable of subsequently recognizing the 
person’s name. This finding suggests that, similar to findings above, young children 
are capable of introspecting about the content of their memories.  
 Within the FOK literature there is considerable debate about whether age-
related differences are present in this ability. Wellman’s (1977a) initial study  
suggested that FOK accuracy continues to develop throughout the elementary years. 
Kindergarten, 1st, and 3rd grade students were asked the names of items depicted as 
line drawings. For items children could not name correctly, children were asked if 
they would be able to recognize the name if provided with a list of possible names. 
Wellman (1977a) found age-related increases in concordance between FOKs and 
recognition accuracy. Brown and Lawton (1977) also reported increased FOK 
accuracy with age in a sample of children with developmental disabilities.   
 However, other research has failed to find developmental differences in the 
accuracy of FOK reports (Butterfield, Nelson, & Peck, 1988; Lockl & Schneider, 
2002). One reason for this discrepancy may the methods used to examine FOK 
judgments (Butterfield et al., 1988). Some researchers have argued that dichotomous 
FOK judgments (i.e., yes/no judgments regarding whether an item will be 
subsequently recognized) may not be appropriate for examining developmental 
change in monitoring abilities because age-related differences may be present in the 
threshold participants set for accepting an item as “known” (Butterfield, Nelson, & 
Peck, 1988; Lockl & Schneider, 2002).  For example, younger participants could be 




they will or they could more liberally claim to later recognize items they will not. For 
this reason Butterfield and colleagues (1988) used a relative FOK assessment (Nelson 
& Narens, 1980). Relative FOKs are obtained by asking participants which item out 
of two they are more likely to subsequently recognize. Then, items are ranked based 
on how likely they are to be remembered. Using this methodology two studies failed 
to detect age-related increases FOK accuracy (Butterfield et al., 1988; Lockl & 
Schneider, 2002).  In fact, one of these studies found that the FOKs of 6-year-olds 
were more accurate than those of adults (Butterfield et al., 1988).  Despite the 
disagreement in the literature about whether accuracy for FOK judgments increase 
with age, all studies show that even young children are capable of making these 
judgments. 
Memory confidence.A number of recent studies have aimed at assessing the 
development of introspection by asking children to rate their confidence about their 
memory for individual items and their contextual details. Although age-related 
improvements are present in the correspondence between children’s confidence 
ratings and response accuracy (Lyons & Ghetti, 2011, 2013), event 3- to 5-year-old 
children’s dichotomous confidence judgments have been shown to differentiate items 
accurately versus inaccurately identified (Lyons & Ghetti, 2011). Furthermore, 
children’s confidence ratings distinguish items based on how they were encoded 
(Ghetti et al., 2010). For example, Ghetti and colleagues (2010) had 7- to 9-year-old 
children enact, imagine, and confabulate (i.e., imagine performing plus describe 
image to experimenter) common and odd actions. When asked to identify actions they 




that action, all children were more confident when rejecting novel actions than 
imagined and confabulated actions. Similarly, another study found that 4th, 6th, and 8th 
grade children were equally as confident about whether they correctly answered a 
multiple-choice question about a story (Schneider & Körkel, 1989).  
 In addition to being able to provide accurate confidence judgments,  even 
preschool aged children use memory confidence to influence their behavior (Balcomb 
& Gerken, 2008). One study allowed 3.5-year-old children to skip trials on an 
associative memory task. Compared to when children were required to provide 
responses, their memory performance was higher when they were allowed to skip 
trials. Further, the amount of time taken to recall a response has been shown to be 
associated with confidence in 2nd, 3rd, and 5th graders, and this relation increases with 
age (Koriat & Ackerman, 2010). These findings collectively suggest that even 
preschool-aged children are capable of monitoring their memory confidence and use 
this monitoring capacity to influence their behavior.  
However, some age-related change is present in children’s confidence ratings. 
Roderer and Roebers (2010) argue that there is a developmental dissociation between 
certainty monitoring and uncertainty monitoring. Whereas both children and adults 
assign high confidence ratings to items they have accurate memory for, children 
assign higher confidence ratings than adults to items they inaccurately remembered 
(e.g., Roebers, 2002). Similarly, one study of lifespan development suggests age-
related differences in uncertainty may occur during the development as well as the 
decline of memory (Shing, Werkle-Bergner, Li, & Lindenberger, 2009). Shing and 




olds, 20-25-year-olds, and 70-75-year-olds performed an associative memory task. 
Whereas 10-12-year-old children provided proportionally fewer “confident” 
responses for accurately remembered items, 70-75-year-old adults reported 
proportionally more “confident” trials for false alarms (i.e., incorrectly recognized 
novel items) compared to the three younger age groups. 
Remember/know paradigm.Tulving’s (1985) remember/know paradigm is 
arguably the most widely utilized metacognitive measures in the adult literature on 
memory. The remember/know paradigm induces what Flavell (1979) referred to as a 
metacognitive experience (i.e., a conscious evaluation of cognition). Participants are 
explicitly asked to reflect on the content and quality of their memory states to 
determine whether an item is “remembered” along with contextual details or merely 
“known.” Tulving initially developed the remember/know paradigm to assess 
autonoetic consciousness, a state of consciousness associated with episodic memory. 
Specifically Tulving argued that autonoetic consciousness “is necessary for the 
remembering of personally experienced events. When a person remembers such an 
event, he is aware of the event as a veridical part of his own past existence (Tulving, 
1985, p. 3).” Since the development of the remember/know paradigm, this 
methodology has been used in hundreds of behavioral and neural investigations of 
memory. 
Beyond the use of the remember/know paradigm as a measure of 
metacognition, researchers have argued that it can be used to dissociate the processes 
of recollection and familiarity which underlie recognition memory (e.g., Yonelinas, 




familiarity refers to the overall assessment of the memory strength. To date, the 
assessment of the development of these processes has predominantly relied on 
objective measures of contextual details as an index of recollection. The reason 
behind this trend is that many researchers question young children’s ability to 
introspect onto their memory states (Brainerd et al., 2003; 2004; Ghetti et al., 2002). 
Brainerd and colleagues (2004) were concerned (a) young children would be unable 
to comprehend instructions differentiating remembered and familiar items, (b) 
modifying instructions to a child-appropriate reading level would make the tasks 
incomparable, and (c) that children may not use the instructions the same way as 
adults even if they were able to comprehend them. However, given the findings above 
suggesting that children are reliable at performing introspective tasks, researchers 
have begun to empirically investigate whether children are capable of performing the 
remember/know paradigm.  
A recent study investigated age-related differences in the ability to use this 
distinction (Ghetti et al., 2011). Participants (i.e., 6-7-year-olds, 9-10-year-olds, 12-
13-year-olds, and 17-18-year-olds) completed a memory paradigm that included 
subjective and objective measures of memory performance. The subjective measures 
were old/new confidence ratings and a modified version of the remember/know 
paradigm. Rather than using the terms “remember” and “know” the terms 
“remember” and “familiar” were used due to pilot testing showing that children were 
better able to understand the term “familiar” than “know.” Objective measures of 
recollection included memory for the original item color and for which semantic 




verify that they were capable of understanding the distinction between the terms 
“remember” and “familiar.” During the classification task participants were presented 
with some statements that should be given a “remember” judgment (e.g., “I know I 
saw a giraffe because it was red”), and others that should be given a “familiar” 
judgment (“I know I saw a stapler but I can’t remember what question I answered 
about it”). For each statement participants were asked which judgment the statement 
should receive. A number of findings suggested that even the youngest participants 
were able to understand and use the remember/familiar distinction. First, all 
participants reliably and accurately classified the statements, although children 
improved with age. Further gave higher confidence ratings to “remembered” than 
“familiar” items and were more likely to state that the item was remembered when 
they accurately remembered the color and semantic judgment made at encoding.  
These findings were replicated and extended by Hembacher and Ghetti 
(2013). As in the previous study, children (6-7-year-olds, 9-10-year-olds) and adults 
both provided relatively more remember judgments when items were retrieved along 
with objective contextual details (i.e., color and a semantic judgment). In this study 
participants were also asked to place bets on trials when they were certain their 
memory was accurate. Participants were told that accurate performance would lead to 
a better prize or more course credit at the end of the study. Although the youngest age 
group appeared to reliably understand the distinction between remembered and 
familiar items, they were not more likely to bet on those items although 9-10-year-




Collectively, the studies by Ghetti and colleagues (Ghetti et al., 2011; 
Hembacher & Ghetti, 2013) suggest that children as young as 6 years of age can 
reliably distinguish between memory states in order to perform the remember/know 
paradigm. However, younger children may not be using the distinction between 
recollection and familiarity to alter their behavior (i.e., as demonstrated by their 
failure to bet larger amounts on items they “remember”). This finding that children 
can reliably perform this task paves the way for future studies on the development of 
recollection and familiarity using the remember/know paradigm in children greater 
than 6 years of age. 
Conclusion 
The phenomenological experience of remembering is important for the role it 
plays in the continuity of the self, perception of others’ perspectives, understanding of 
previously experienced events, and our ability to imagine the future (e.g., Buckner & 
Carroll, 2007; Rajaram & Roediger, 1997; Schacter, Addis, & Buckner, 2007). 
Assessments of remembering require participants to metacognitively introspect about 
the contents of their memories, an ability that developmental memory researchers, 
until recently, were highly skeptical of in children. The current literature suggests that 
during the elementary school years children develop a substantial knowledge base 
about their memory capabilities. For complex tasks, such as the identification and 
efficient utilization of memory strategies, development continues well into 
adolescence. Memory introspection tasks (i.e., judgments of learning, feelings of 
knowing, confidence ratings, and the remember/know paradigm) that require children 




consistently shown that, although age-related differences are present in these abilities, 
children can reliably perform them at a young age (i.e., as young as 3 years of age). 
These findings pave the way for more advanced studies of the development of 
children’s memories and the processes that underlie these changes (e.g., 
investigations of properties associated with recollection and familiarity across 
development). Future research aimed at investigating the neural bases of 
remembering and developmental origins of autobiographical remembering will have 




















Remember/Familiar Classification Task 
“A group of children already looked at pictures like the ones you just saw.  
While they looked at drawings, they had to say what color the picture was, and say if 
the things in the drawings were living/not living or if they could fit inside of the box, 
the same as what you did. 
After that, we tested their memory for those drawings.  We showed them the 
same drawings, but this time in black ink.  They had to tell us if they had seen the 
drawings before, and what they remembered about them.  For example, they could 
tell us the color of the picture, or the question we had asked them about it.   
Now, I’m going to read you what the children said about the drawings. I want 
you to tell me if they remembered the drawings, or if they felt they were familiar.  If 
the person could tell a detail about the drawing, that means it was remembered.  If 
the person says she saw the drawing before, but can’t tell any of the details about it, 
that means it’s familiar.   
Let’s try with an example.  One person said, “I know there was a dinosaur, 
because you asked me if it was living or not living.” Is this a remember description or 
a familiar description?”   
If the participant is correct say, “Good. I’m going to read you more responses 
now.  If you think it’s a remember description, say ‘remember.’  If you think it’s a 
familiar description, say ‘familiar.’” 
If the participant is incorrect, read the difference between remember/familiar 
descriptions and dinosaur example again. 
“Ok, let’s start!” 
1 
You showed me a carrot, it was red and I said it could fit 
inside of the box. 
R 
 
2 I saw a moose, but I can’t tell if it was red or green. F  
3 I think there was a pear, but I can’t see what color it was. F  
4 





You showed me a jungle gym because you asked me whether it 














You showed me a picture of a globe, but I don’t remember the 




I am very sure that I saw a swing but I can’t remember what 
you asked me. 
F 
 
10 I looked at a pony, it was red. R  
11 I saw a mailbox, but I’m not sure what color it was. F  
12 
There was a drawing of an painting, but I can’t tell whether it 







I think you showed me a lightening bug, but I’m not sure what 




You showed me a phone, but I can’t tell if I said it was living 













17 I saw a pelican, because I can picture that it was green. R  
18  I think there was a turkey, because I can see it in green. R  
19 
I think there was a snake, but I’m not sure about the question 




There was definitely a picture frame, but I don’t know the 




I’m positive that you showed me a coyote because it was green 
and I said it could not fit inside of the box. 
R 
 
22 I think that I saw yarn, but I’m not sure why. F  
23 I am very sure that I saw a crow before, but I can’t tell why F  
24 I saw an eagle, because I said it was red. R  
25 I saw an eel, but I’m not sure about the color. F  
26 




27 There was definitely an opossum, it was green. R  
28 I am sure there was a clown fish because it was red. R  
29 
I definitely saw a panther, but I can’t tell you what question 









There was a drawing of a swimming pool for sure, because you 




 I saw sunglasses, I can picture them in red and I said they 









There was a weasel, but I can’t tell you the color or the 



























Additional ERP Analyses 
Study 1: Encoding 
Subsequent subjective recollection. In the early time window (150-300 ms 
for children and adolescents; 125-250 for adults), there was an Age Group x 
Condition x Coronal Plane interaction, F(8, 256) = 2.69, p = .017, and an Age Group 
x Condition x Coronal Plane x Sagittal Plane interaction, F(16, 512) = 2.56, p = .002. 
When follow-up analyses were conducted separately by age group, children 
demonstrated a Condition x Coronal Plane x Sagittal Plane interaction F(8, 128) = 
2.39, p = .019. No main effect of or interaction with condition was present at frontal 
or parietal leads. At central leads there was a Condition x Sagittal Plane interaction, 
F(4, 64) = 3.03, p = .024. Although the conditions changed their relative positions 
across the coronal plane, no main effect of Condition was present at the right, 
midline, or left central lead. For adolescents, there was no significant main effect of 
or interaction with Condition.  In adults there was a Condition x Coronal Plane 
interaction, F(4, 100) = 3.61, p = .022. Although the conditions changed their relative 
positions across the coronal plane, no main effect of condition was present at frontal, 
central, or parietal leads. In the second time window (150-300 ms for children and 
adolescents; 125-250 for adults), there was an Age Group x Condition x Coronal 
Plane x Sagittal Plane interaction, F(16, 512) = 2.32, p = .006. In children, there was 
a Condition x Coronal Plane x Sagittal Plane interaction, F(8, 128) = 2.46, p = .027. 
Main effects of condition or interactions with condition were not significant for 




adults, there was no significant main effect of or interaction with Condition. In the 
third time window (500-700 ms), there was a Condition x Sagittal Plane interaction, 
F(4, 256) = 2.85, p = .032. Although the conditions changed their relative positions 
across the sagittal plane, no main effect of condition was present at left, central, or 
right leads.  
Subsequent color recollection. In the early time window (150-300 ms for 
children and adolescents; 125-250 for adults), there was an Age Group x Condition x 
Coronal Plane interaction, F(8, 240) = 4.22, p = .001. When follow-up analyses were 
conducted separately by age group, a Condition x Coronal Plane interaction was 
present in all age groups, children, F(4, 84) = 3.11, p = .04, adolescents, F(4, 68) = 
3.09, p = .05, and adults,  F(4, 88) = 5.04, p = .009.  However, there was no main 
effect of condition at frontal, central, or parietal leads in any age group. Condition 
and coronal plane interacted with age group because the relative positions of the 
conditions altered across the coronal plane differed across age groups. In the second 
time window (150-300 ms for children and adolescents; 125-250 for adults), there 
was an Age Group x Condition x Coronal Plane interaction, F(8, 240) = 2.55, p = 
.024. In children and adolescents, there was no significant main effect of or 
interaction with Condition. In adults, there was a significant Condition x Coronal 
Plane interaction, F(4, 88) = 3.5, p = .033. Although the conditions changed their 
relative positions across the coronal plane, no main effect of condition was present at 
frontal, central, or parietal leads. In the third time window (500-700 ms), there was an 
Age Group x Condition x Coronal Plane interaction, F(8, 240) = 2.95, p = .009. In 




Condition. In adults, there was a Condition x Coronal Plane interaction, F(2, 88) = 
4.42, p = .003. Follow-up analyses at frontal, central, and parietal leads, revealed no 
significant main effect of or interaction with Condition. 
Subsequent task recollection. There was no main effect of or interaction 
within Condition in the first (150-300 ms for children and adolescents; 125-250 for 
adults) or second time windows (150-300 ms for children and adolescents; 125-250 
for adults). In the third time window (500-700 ms), there was an Age Group x 
Condition x Coronal Plane interaction, F(4, 296) = 2.44, p = .03. No main effect of or 
interaction with condition was present in children or adolescents. Adults 
demonstrated a main effect of Condition, F(2, 54) = 3.82, p = .028, that was qualified 
by a Condition x Coronal Plane interaction, F(4, 108) = 3.77, p = .011. Follow-up 
analyses revealed a significant main effect of Condition at central, F(2, 54) = 4.93, p 
= .01, and parietal, F(2, 54) = 4.7, p = .013, but not frontal leads, F(2, 54) = 2.3, p = 
.11.  At central leads, the amplitude elicited to items subsequently recollected with the 
task-correct was significantly larger than items with the task-incorrect, with missed 
items in-between (see Figure 6). At parietal leads, the amplitude elicited to task-
correct and missed items was larger than task-incorrect items (see Figure 6). 
Study 2: Retrieval 
Subjective recollection. There was no main effect of or interaction with 
Condition in the first (150-300 ms for children; 125-250 for adolescents and adults) 
or second time windows (300-450 ms for children; 250-450 for adolescents and 
adults). In the later time window (700-900 ms), results revealed an Age Group x 




emerged from a change in the relative position of conditions across the coronal plane 
as a function of age group. However, follow-up analyses did not reveal significant 
memory effects in any age group during this time window.  
Color recollection. For the earliest time window (150-300 ms for children; 
125-250 for adolescents and adults) there was no main effect of or interaction with 
Condition. During the second time window (300-450 ms for children; 250-450 for 
adolescents and adults), there was a Condition x Sagittal Plane interaction, F(4, 200) 
= 4.05, p = .004. This interaction emerged from a change in the relative position of 
conditions across the sagittal plane. However, follow-up analyses did not reveal a 
significant main effect of or interaction with condition at any sagittal plane. For the 
last time window (700-900 ms), there was a Condition x Sagittal Plane interaction, 
F(4, 200) = 3.55, p = .008, and a Condition x Coronal Plane x Sagittal Plane 
interaction, F(8, 400) = 2.86, p = .011. Follow-up analyses were conducted separately 
for each Sagittal Plane. No main effect of or interaction with Condition was present at 
left or right leads. A Condition x Coronal Plane interaction was present at midline 
leads, F(4, 200) = 4.27, p = .007. This interaction emerged due to a change in the 
relative position of Conditions across the Coronal Plane. However, a main effect of 
condition was not present at frontal, central, or parietal midline leads.  
Task recollection. In the earliest time window (150-300 ms for children; 125-
250 for adolescents and adults) there was a Condition x Coronal Plane interaction, 
F(4, 244) = 4.33, p = .008, and a Condition x Sagittal Plane interaction, F(4, 244) = 
3.29, p = .021. No main effect of or interaction with condition was present for follow-




 During the second time window (300-450 ms for children; 250-450 for 
adolescents and adults), there was a Condition x Coronal Plane interaction, F(4, 244) 
= 10.53, p < .001, and a Condition x Sagittal Plane interaction, F(4, 244) = 5.25, p = 
.001, that was qualified by Age Group, F(8, 244) = 3.93, p = .001. In children, there 
was a significant Condition x Sagittal Plane interaction, F(4, 64) = 5.39, p = .001. At 
right leads there was a Condition x Coronal Plane interaction, F(4, 64) = 3.17, p = 
.042. Although leads changed relative position across the Coronal Plane, no 
significant main effect of Condition was present at right frontal, central, or parietal 
leads. In adolescents, there was a Condition x Coronal Plane interaction, F(4, 72) = 
7.97, p < .001. At frontal and central leads, there was a main effect of Condition, F(2, 
36) = 4.49, p = .031. The amplitude of the response elicited to task-correct items was 
less negative than task-incorrect items with correctly rejected items in-between (see 
Figure 6). No main effect of or interaction with Condition was present in adults.  
Analysis of the last time window (700-900 ms) revealed a Condition x Sagittal 
Plane x Age Group interaction, F(8, 244) = 2.16, p = .041, and a Condition x Coronal 
Plane x Sagittal Plane interaction, F(8, 488) = 2.27, p = .043. No main effect of or 
interaction with condition was present in children. In adolescents, a Condition x 
Coronal Plane x Sagittal Plane interaction emerged, F(8, 144) = 2.71, p = .048. 
However, when follow-up analyses were conducted separately for each coronal and 
sagittal plane, no main effect of or interaction with Condition was present. No main 






Achim, A. M., & Lepage, M. (2005). Neural correlates of memory for items and for 
associations: an event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging study. 
Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 17(4), 652–67. 
doi:10.1162/0898929053467578 
Baker-Ward, L., Ornstein, P. A., Holden, D. J. (1984). The expression of 
memorization in early childhood. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 
37(3), 555-575. 10.1016/0022-0965(84)90076-6 
Balcomb, F. K., & Gerken, L. (2008). Three-year-old children can access their own 
memory to guide responses on a visual matching task. Developmental Science, 
11(5), 750–60. doi:10.1111/j.1467-7687.2008.00725.x 
Baron-Cohen, S., Leslie, A. M., & Frith, U. (1985). Does the autistic child have a 
“theory of mind” ? Cognition, 21(1), 37–46. doi:10.1016/0010-
0277(85)90022-8 
Bartsch, K., & Wellman, H. M. (1995). Children talk about the mind. Oxford 
University Press. New York.  
Beal, C. (1985). Development of knowledge about the use of cues to aid prospective 
retrieval. Child Development, 56(3), 631–642. doi: 10.2307/1129753 
Billingsley, R. L., Smith, M. L., & McAndrews, M. P. (2002). Developmental 
patterns in priming and familiarity in explicit recollection. Journal of 





Bjorklund, D. F., & Green, B. L. (1992). The adaptive nature of cognitive immaturity. 
American Psychologist, 47(1), 46–54. doi:10.1037//0003-066X.47.1.46 
Bjorklund, D. F., Periss, V., & Causey, K. (2009). The benefits of youth. European 
Journal of Developmental Psychology, 6(1), 120–137. 
doi:10.1080/17405620802602334 
Bjorklund, D., & Zeman, B. (1982). Children’s organization and metamemory 
awareness in their recall of familiar information. Child Development, 53(3), 
799–810. doi:10.2307/1129394 
Brainerd, C. J., Holliday, R. E., & Reyna, V. F. (2004). Behavioral measurement of 
remembering phenomenologies: So simple a child can do it. Child 
Development, 75(2), 505–22. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8624.2004.00689.x 
Brainerd, C. J., Payne, D. G., Wright, R., & Reyna, V. F. (2003). Phantom recall. 
Journal of Memory and Language, 48(3), 445–467. doi:10.1016/S0749-
596X(02)00501-6 
Brewer, J. B., Zhao, Z., Desmond, J. E., Glover, G. H., & Gabrieli, J. D. (1998). 
Making memories: Brain activity that predicts how well visual experience will 
be remembered. Science, 281(5380), 1185–7. doi: 
10.1126/science.281.5380.1185 
Bretherton, I., McNew, S., & Beeghly-Smith, M. (1981). Early person knowledge as 
expressed in gestural and verbal communication: When do infants acquire a 
‘theory of mind’? In M. E. Lamb & L. R. Sherrod (Eds.). Infant Social 




Brown, A. L., & Lawton, S. C. (1977). The feeling of knowing experience in 
educable retarded children. Developmental Psychology, 13(4), 364–370. 
doi:10.1037//0012-1649.13.4.364 
Brown, J., & Dunn, J. (1991). “You can cry, mum”: The social and developmental 
implications of talk about internal states. British Journal of Developmental 
Psychology, 9(2), 237–256. doi:10.1111/j.2044-835X.1991.tb00874.x/abstract 
Buckner, R. L., & Carroll, D. C. (2007). Self-projection and the brain. Trends in 
Cognitive Sciences, 11(2), 49–57. doi:10.1016/j.tics.2006.11.004 
Butterfield, E. C., Nelson, T. O., & Peck, V. (1988). Developmental aspects of the 
feeling of knowing. Developmental Psychology, 24(5), 654–663. 
doi:10.1037//0012-1649.24.5.654 
Cansino, S., Maquet, P., Dolan, R. J., & Rugg, M. D. (2002). Brain activity 
underlying encoding and retrieval of source memory. Cerebral Cortex, 
12(10), 1048–56. doi:10.1093/cercor/12.10.1048 
Carruthers, P. (2009). How we know our own minds: the relationship between 
mindreading and metacognition. The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 32(2), 
121–38. doi:10.1017/S0140525X09000545 
Cherney, I. (2003). Young children’s spontaneous utterances of mental terms and the 
accuracy of their memory behaviors: a different methodological approach. 
Infant and Child Development, 105, 89–105. doi:10.1002/icd. 
Chua, E. F., Rand-Giovannetti, E., Schacter, D. L., Albert, M. S., & Sperling, R. A. 




imaging shows origins of the subjective memory experience. Journal of 
Cognitive Neuroscience, 16(7), 1131–42. doi:10.1162/0898929041920568 
Craik, F. I., & Lockhart, R. S. (1972). Levels of processing: A framework for 
memory research. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 11, 671-
684. doi: 10.1016/S0022-5371(72)80001-X 
Crone, E. A., & Dahl, R. E. (2012). Understanding adolescence as a period of social-
affective engagement and goal flexibility. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 
13(9), 636–50. doi:10.1038/nrn3313 
Cultice, J., Somerville, S., & Wellman, H. (1983). Preschoolers’ memory monitoring: 
Feeling-of-knowing judgments. Child Development, 54(6), 1480–1486 
doi:10.2307/1129810 
Curran, T. (2000). Brain potentials of recollection and familiarity. Memory & 
Cognition, 28(6), 923–38. doi: 10.3758/BF03209340 
Curran, T., & Cleary, A. (2003). Using ERPs to dissociate recollection from 
familiarity in picture recognition. Cognitive Brain Research, 15, 191–205. 
doi: 10.1016/S0926-6410(02)00192-1 
Cycowicz, Y. (2000). Memory development and event-related brain potentials in 
children. Biological Psychology, 54(1-3), 145–74. doi:10.1016/S0301-
0511(00)00055-7 
Cycowicz, Y. M., Friedman, D., & Duff, M. (2003). Pictures and their colors: what 





Cycowicz, Y. M., Friedman, D., & Snodgrass, J. G. (2001). Remembering the color 
of objects: an ERP investigation of source memory. Cerebral Cortex, 11(4), 
322–34. doi:10.1093/cercor/11.4.322 
Czernochowski, D., Mecklinger, A., & Johansson, M. (2009). Age-related changes in 
the control of episodic retrieval: an ERP study of recognition memory in 
children and adults. Developmental Science, 12(6), 1026–40. 
doi:10.1111/j.1467-7687.2009.00841.x 
Czernochowski, D., Mecklinger, A., Johansson, M., & Brinkmann, M. (2005). Age-
related differences in familiarity and recollection: ERP evidence from a 
recognition memory study in children and young adults. Cognitive, Affective 
& Behavioral Neuroscience, 5(4), 417–33. doi:10.3758/CABN.5.4.417 
DeBoer, T., Scott, L. S., & Nelson., C. A. (2005). Event-related potentials in 
developmental populations. In T. Handy (Ed.). Event-related potentials: A 
Methods Handbook (pp. 263-297). Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. 
DeBoer, T., Scott, L. S. & Nelson, C. A. (2007).  Methods for acquiring and 
analyzing infant event-related potentials.  In M. de Haan (Ed.), Infant EEG 
and Event-Related Potentials (pp. 5-37).  New York: Psychology Press. 
DeMaster, D. M., & Ghetti, S. (2013). Developmental differences in hippocampal and 
cortical contributions to episodic retrieval. Cortex, 49, 1482-1493. doi: 
10.1016/j.cortex.2012.08.004 
Diana, R. A., Yonelinas, A. P., & Ranganath, C. (2007). Imaging recollection and 
familiarity in the medial temporal lobe: A three-component model. TRENDS 




Dobbins, I. G., & Han, S. (2006). Cue- versus probe-dependent prefrontal cortex 
activity during contextual remembering. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 
18(9), 1439–52. doi:10.1162/jocn.2006.18.9.1439 
Donaldson, D. I., & Rugg, M. D. (1998). Recognition memory for new associations: 
electrophysiological evidence for the role of recollection. Neuropsychologia, 
36(5), 377–95. doi:10.1016/S0028-3932(97)00143-7 
Drummey, A. B., & Newcombe, N. S. (2002). Developmental changes in source 
memory. Developmental Science, 5(4), 502–513. doi:10.1111/1467-
7687.00243 
Duarte, A., Ranganath, C., & Knight, R. T. (2005). Effects of unilateral prefrontal 
lesions on familiarity, recollection, and source memory. The Journal of 
Neuroscience, 25(36), 8333–7. doi:10.1523/JNEUROSCI.1392-05.2005 
Duarte, A., Ranganath, C., Winward, L., Hayward, D., & Knight, R. T. (2004). 
Dissociable neural correlates for familiarity and recollection during the 
encoding and retrieval of pictures. Cognitive Brain Research, 18(3), 255–272. 
doi:10.1016/j.cogbrainres.2003.10.010 
Dudukovic, N. M., & Knowlton, B. J. (2006). Remember-Know judgments and 
retrieval of contextual details. Acta Psychologica, 122(2), 160–73. 
doi:10.1016/j.actpsy.2005.11.002 
Dufresne, A., & Kobasigawa, A. (1989). Children’s spontaneous allocation of study 
time: Differential and sufficient aspects. Journal of Experimental Child 




Eisenberg, N., Murphy, B. C., & Shepard, S. (1997). The development of empathic 
accuracy. In W. Icles (Ed.) Empathic accuracy (pp. 73-116). New York: 
Guilford Press. 
Eskritt, M., & Lee, K. (2002). “Remember where you last saw that card”: Children’s 
production of external symbols as a memory aid. Developmental Psychology, 
38(2), 254–266. doi:10.1037//0012-1649.38.2.254 
Eskritt, M., & McLeod, K. (2008). Children’s note taking as a mnemonic tool. 
Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 101(1), 52–74. 
doi:10.1016/j.jecp.2008.05.007 
Estes, D. (1998). Young children’s awareness of their mental activity: The case of 
mental rotation. Child Development, 69(5), 1345–1360. doi:10.1111/j.1467-
8624.1998.tb06216.x/abstract 
Flavell, J. (1971). First discussant’s comments: What is memory development the 
development of? Human Development, 14, 272–278. doi: 10.1159/000271221 
Flavell, J. H. (1979). Metacognition and cognitive monitoring: A new area of 
cognitive-developmental inquiry. American Psychologist, 34(10), 906–911. 
doi:10.1037//0003-066X.34.10.906 
Flavell, J., Flavell, E., & Green, F. (1983). Development of the appearance-reality 
distinction. Cognitive Psychology, 15, 95–120. doi: 10.1016/0010-
0285(83)90005-1 
Flavell, J., Friedrichs, A., & Hoyt, J. (1970). Developmental changes in memorization 





Flavell, J. H., Green, F. L., & Flavell, E. R. (1993). Children’s understanding of the 
stream of consciousness. Child Development, 64(2), 387. 
doi:10.2307/1131257 
Flavell, J. H., Green, F., & Flavell, E. R. (1997). The mind has a mind of its own: 
Developing knowledge about mental uncontrollability. Cognitive 
Development, 13(1), 127–138. doi: 10.1016/S0885-2014(98)90024-7 
Flavell, J. H., Green, F., & Flavell, E. R. (2000). Development of children’s 
awareness of their own thoughts. Journal of Cognition and Development, 1, 
97–112. doi:10.1207/S15327647JCD0101N_10 
Flavell, J. H., Green, F. L., Flavell, E. R., Harris, P. L., & Astington, J. W. (1995). 
Young children's knowledge about thinking. Monographs of the Society for 
Research in Child Development, 60(243). doi:10.2307/1166124 
Fletcher, P. C., & Henson, R. N. (2001). Frontal lobes and human memory: insights 
from functional neuroimaging. Brain, 124(5), 849–81. 
doi:10.1093/brain/124.5.849 
Friedman, D, & Johnson, R. (2000). Event-related potential (ERP) studies of memory 
encoding and retrieval: A selective review. Microscopy Research and 
Technique, 51(1), 6–28. doi:10.1002/1097-0029(20001001)51:1<6::AID-
JEMT2>3.0.CO;2-R 
Friedman, D., & Trott, C. (2000). An event-related potential study of encoding in 





Friedman, D., de Chastelaine, M., Nessler, D., & Malcolm, B. (2010). Changes in 
familiarity and recollection across the lifespan: an ERP perspective. Brain 
Research, 1310, 124–41. doi:10.1016/j.brainres.2009.11.016 
Friedman, W. J. (2007). The development of temporal metamemory. Child 
Development, 78(5), 1472–1491. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8624.2007.01078.x 
Frith, U., & Happe, F. (1999). Theory of mind and self-consciousness: What is it like 
to be autistic? Mind and Language, 14(1), 82–89. doi:10.1111/1468-
0017.00100 
Geis, M., & Lange, G. (1976). Children’s cue utilization in a memory-for-location 
task. Child Development, 47(3), 759–766. doi:10.2307/1128192 
Geraci, L., McCabe, D. P., & Guillory, J. J. (2009). On interpreting the relationship 
between remember-know judgments and confidence: the role of instructions. 
Consciousness and Cognition, 18(3), 701–9. 
doi:10.1016/j.concog.2009.04.010 
Ghetti, S., & Alexander, K. W. (2004). “If it happened, I would remember it”: 
strategic use of event memorability in the rejection of false autobiographical 
events. Child Development, 75(2), 542–61. doi:10.1111/j.1467-
8624.2004.00692.x 
Ghetti, S., & Angelini, L. (2008). The development of recollection and familiarity in 
childhood and adolescence: evidence from the dual-process signal detection 





Ghetti, S., Castelli, P., & Lyons, K. E. (2010). Knowing about not remembering: 
developmental dissociations in lack-of-memory monitoring. Developmental 
Science, 13(4), 611–21. doi:10.1111/j.1467-7687.2009.00908.x 
Ghetti, S., DeMaster, D. M., Yonelinas, A. P., & Bunge, S. A. (2010). Developmental 
differences in medial temporal lobe function during memory encoding. The 
Journal of Neuroscience, 30(28), 9548–56. doi:10.1523/JNEUROSCI.3500-
09.2010 
Ghetti, S., Hembacher, E., & Coughlin, C. A. (2013). Feeling uncertain and acting on 
it during the preschool years: A metacognitive approach. Child Development 
Perspectives, 7(3), 160-165. doi:10.1111/cdep.12035 
Ghetti, S., Mirandola, C., Angelini, L., Cornoldi, C., & Ciaramelli, E. (2011). 
Development of subjective recollection: Understanding of and introspection 
on memory states. Child Development, 82(6), 1954–69. doi:10.1111/j.1467-
8624.2011.01645.x 
Ghetti, S., Qin, J., & Goodman, G. S. (2002). False memories in children and adults: 
Age, distinctiveness, and subjective experience. Developmental Psychology, 
38(5), 705–718. doi:10.1037//0012-1649.38.5.705 
Glenwright, M., & Pexman, P. M. (2010). Development of children’s ability to 
distinguish sarcasm and verbal irony. Journal of Child Language, 37(2), 429–
51. doi:10.1017/S0305000909009520 
Gogtay, N., Giedd., J. N., Lusk, L., Hayashi, K. M., Greenstein, D., Vaituzis, A. C., 
… Thompson, P. M. (2004). Dynamic mapping of human cortical 




National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America. 101(21) 8174-
8179. doi: 10.1073/pnas.0402680101 
Groh-Bordin, C., Zimmer, H. D., & Ecker, U. K. (2006). Has the butcher on the bus 
dyed his hair? When color changes modulate ERP correlates of familiarity and 
recollection. Neuroimage, 32, 1879-1890. doi: 
10.1016/j.neuroimage.2006.04.215 
Güler, O. E., & Thomas, K. M. (2013). Developmental differences in the neural 
correlates of relational encoding and recall in children: An event-related fMRI 
study. Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience, 3, 106-116. 
doi:10.1016/j.dcn.2012.07.001 
Guo, C., Duan, L., Li, W., & Paller, K. A. (2006). Distinguishing source memory and 
item memory: brain potentials at encoding and retrieval. Brain Research, 
1118(1), 142–54. doi:10.1016/j.brainres.2006.08.034 
Halit, H., de Haan, M., & Johnson, M. H. (2003). Cortical specialisation for face 
processing: face-sensitive event-related potential components in 3- and 12-
month-old infants. Neuroimage, 19, 1180-1193. doi: 10.1016/S1053-
8119(03)00076-4 
Hayes, D. S., Scott, L. C., Chemelski, B. E., & Johnson, J. (1987). Physical and 
emotional states as memory-relevant factors : Cognitive monitoring by young 
children. Marill-Palmer Quarterly, 33(4), 473–487. 
Hembacher, E., & Ghetti, S. (2013). How to bet on a memory: Developmental 




Experimental Child Psychology, 115(3), 436–52. 
doi:10.1016/j.jecp.2013.03.010 
Henson, R. N. A., Rugg, M. D., Shallice, T., Josephs, O., & Dolan, R. J. (1999). 
Recollection and familiarity in recognition memory: An event-related 
functional magnetic resonance imaging study. The Journal of Neuroscience, 
19(10), 3962–72.  
Hogrefe, G. J., Wimmer, H., & Perner, J. (1986). Ignorance versus false belief: A 
developmental lag in attribution of epistemic states. Child Development, 57 
567-582. doi: 10.2307/1130337 
Howe, M. L., & Courage, M. L. (1997). The emergence and early development of 
autobiographical memory. Psychological Review, 104(3), 499–523. 
doi:10.1037//0033-295X.104.3.499 
Ille, N., Berg, P., & Scherg, M. (2002). Artifact correction of the ongoing EEG using 
spatial filters based on artifact and brain signal topographies. Journal of 
Clinical Neurophysiology, 19(2), 113-124. doi: 10.1097/00004691-
200203000-00002 
Jeffreys, H. (1961). Theory of probability (3rd ed.). Oxford Classic Texts in the 
Physical Sciences. Oxford University Press, Oxford.  
Johnson, C., & Wellman, H. (1980). Children’s developing understanding of mental 
verbs: Remember, know, and guess. Child Development, 51(4), 1095–1102. 
doi: 10.2307/1129549 
Johnson, M. H. (2001). Functional brain development in humans. Nature Reviews 




Kail, R. (1990). The Development of Memory in Children (3rd ed.). New York: W. H. 
Freemen and Company. 
Karably, K., & Zabrucky, K. (2009). Children’s metamemory: A review of the 
literature and implications for the classroom. International Electronic Journal 
of Elementary Education, 2(1), 404–413.  
Kobasigawa, A., & Metcalf-Haggert, A. (1993). Spontaneous allocation of study time 
by first-and third-grade children in a simple memory task. The Journal of 
Genetic Psychology, 154(2), 223–235. doi: 10.1080/00221325.1993.9914736 
Kolić-Vehovec, S., Bajšanski, I., & Zubković, B. R. (2010). Metacognition and 
reading comprehension: Age and gender differences. In A. Efklides and P. 
Misailidi (Eds.), Trends and Prospects in Metacognition Research (pp.327-
344). New York: Springer. 
Kopelman, M. D., Stanhope, N., & Kingsley, D. (1997). Temporal and spatial context 
memory in patients with focal frontal, temporal lobe, and diencephalic lesions. 
Neuropsychologia, 35(12), 1533–45. doi:10.1016/S0028-3932(97)00076-6 
Koriat, A., & Ackerman, R. (2010). Choice latency as a cue for children’s subjective 
confidence in the correctness of their answers. Developmental Science, 13(3), 
441–53. doi:10.1111/j.1467-7687.2009.00907.x 
Koriat, A., Ackerman, R., Lockl, K., & Schneider, W. (2009). The memorizing effort 
heuristic in judgments of learning: a developmental perspective. Journal of 





Koriat, A., & Shitzer-Reichert, R. (2002). Metacognitive judgments and their 
accuracy: Insights from the processes underlying judgments of learning in 
children. In P. Chambres, M. Izaute, & P.-J. Marescaux (Eds.), 
Metacognition: Process, function, and use (pp. 1–17). New York: Kluwer. 
Kreutzer, M., Leonard, C., Flavell, J. H., & Hagen, J. W. (1975). An interview study 
of children’s knowledge about memory. Monographs of the Society for 
Research in Child Development, 40(1), 1–60. doi:10.2307/1165955 
Limber, J. (1973). The genesis of complex sentences. In T. E. Moore (Ed.), Cognitive 
Development and the Acquisition of Language (pp. 169–185). New York: 
Academic Press. 
Lipko, A. R., Dunlosky, J., & Merriman, W. E. (2009). Persistent overconfidence 
despite practice: the role of task experience in preschoolers’ recall predictions. 
Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 103(2), 152–66. 
doi:10.1016/j.jecp.2008.10.002 
Lipowski, S. L., Merriman, W. E., & Dunlosky, J. (2013). Preschoolers can make 
highly accurate judgments of learning. Developmental Psychology, 49(8), 
1505–1516. doi:10.1037/a0030614 
Lloyd, M. E., Doydum, A. O., & Newcombe, N. S. (2009). Memory binding in early 
childhood: evidence for a retrieval deficit. Child Development, 80(5), 1321–8. 
doi:10.1111/j.1467-8624.2009.01353.x 
Lockl, K., & Schneider, W. (2002). Developmental trends in children’s feeling-of-
knowing judgements. International Journal of Behavioral Development, 




Lockl, K., & Schneider, W. (2004). The effects of incentives and instructions on 
children’s allocation of study time. European Journal of Developmental 
Psychology, 1(2), 153–169. doi:10.1080/17405620444000085 
London, K., Bruck, M., Poole, D. A., & Melnyk, L. (2011). The development of 
metasuggestibility in children. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 25(1), 146–155. 
doi:10.1002/acp.1653 
Lovett, S., & Flavell, J. (1990). Understanding and remembering: Children’s 
knowledge about the differential effects of strategy and task variables on 
compre hension and memorization. Child Development, 61(6), 1842–1858. 
doi: 10.2307/1130841 
Luck, S. J. (2005). An Introduction to the Event-Related Potential Technique. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Lyon, T., & Flavell, J. (1993). Young children’s understanding of forgetting over 
time. Child Development, 64(3), 789–800. doi:10.1111/j.1467-
8624.1993.tb02943.x/abstract 
Lyons, K. E., & Ghetti, S. (2011). The development of uncertainty monitoring in 
early childhood. Child Development, 82(6), 1778–87. doi:10.1111/j.1467-
8624.2011.01649.x 
Lyons, K. E., & Ghetti, S. (2013). I don’t want to pick! Introspection on uncertainty 





Macnamara, J., Baker, E., & Olson, C. (1976). Four-year-olds’ understanding of 
“Ppretend”, “forget”, and “know”: Evidence for propositional operations. 
Child Development, 47(1), 62–70. doi: 10.2307/1128283 
Mangels, J. A, Picton, T. W., & Craik, F. I. (2001). Attention and successful episodic 
encoding: an event-related potential study. Cognitive Brain Research, 11(1), 
77–95. doi: 10.1016/S0926-6410(00)00066-5 
Markman, E. (1977). Realizing that you don’t understand: A preliminary 
investigation. Child Development, 48(3), 986–992. doi: 10.2307/1128350 
Marshall, D. H., Drummey, A. B., Fox, N. A., & Newcombe, N. S. (2002). An event-
related potential study of item recognition memory in children and adults. 
Journal of Cognition and Development, 3(2), 201–224. 
doi:10.1207/S15327647JCD0302_4 
Masur, E. F., McIntyre, C. W., & Flavell, J. H. (1973). Developmental changes in 
apportionment of study time among items in a multitrial free recall task. 
Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 15, 237-246. doi: 10.1016/0022-
0965(73)90145-8 
Mathews, M., & Fozard, J. (1970). Age differences in judgments of recency for short 
sequences of pictures. Developmental Psychology, 3(2), 208–217. doi: 
10.1037/h0029582 
Mecklinger, A., Brunnemann, N., & Kipp, K. (2011). Two processes for recognition 
memory in children of early school age: an event-related potential study. 





Miller, P. H., & Weiss, M. G. (1982). Children’s and adults ' knowledge about what 
variables affect selective attention. Child Development, 53(2), 543–549. doi: 
10.2307/1128997 
Mills, D. L., Coffey-Corina, S., & Neville, H. J. (1997). Language comprehension 
and cerebral specialization from 13 to 20 months. Developmental 
Neuropsychology, 13(3), 397-445. doi: 10.1080/87565649709540685 
Miscione, J., Marvin, R., O’Brien, R., & Greenberg, M. (1978). A developmental 
study of preschool children’s understanding of the words “know” and “guess.” 
Child Development, 49(4), 1107–1113. doi: 10.2307/1128750 
Moynahan, E. (1973). The development of knowledge concerning the effect of 
categorization upon free recall. Child Development, 44(2), 238–246. doi: 
10.2307/1128042 
Nelson, T., & Dunlosky, J. (1991). When people’s judgments of learning (JOLs) are 
extremely accurate at predicting subsequent recall: The “delayed-JOL effect.” 
Psychological Science, 2(4), 267–270. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-
9280.1991.tb00147.x 
Nelson, T., & Narens, L. (1980). A new technique for investigating the feeling of 
knowing. Acta Psychologica, 46, 69–80. doi: 10.1016/0001-6918(80)90060-8 
Nichols, S., & Stich, S. (2003). How to read your own mind: A cognitive theory of 
self-consciousness. In Q. Smith & A. Jokic (Eds.), Consciousness: New 
Essays. A Cognitive Theory of Self-Consciousness (pp. 157-200). New York: 




O’Sullivan, J., Howe, M., & Marche, T. (1996). Children’s beliefs about long‐term 
retention. Child Development, 67(6), 2989–3009. doi:10.1111/j.1467-
8624.1996.tb01899.x/abstract 
Ofen, N., Kao, Y.-C., Sokol-Hessner, P., Kim, H., Whitfield-Gabrieli, S., & Gabrieli, 
J. D. E. (2007). Development of the declarative memory system in the human 
brain. Nature neuroscience, 10(9), 1198–205. doi:10.1038/nn1950 
Perner, J., Kloo, D., & Stöttinger, E. (2007). Introspection & remembering. Synthese, 
159(2), 253–270. doi:10.1007/sl 
Perner, J., & Wimmer, H. (1985). “John thinks that Mary thinks that” attribution of 
second-order beliefs by 5-to 10-year-old children. Journal of Experimental 
Child Psychology, 39, 437–471. doi: 10.1016/0022-0965(85)90051-7 
Piolino, P., Hisland, M., Ruffeveille, I., Matuszewski, V., Jambaqué, I., & Eustache, 
F. (2007). Do school-age children remember or know the personal past? 
Consciousness and Cognition, 16(1), 84–101. 
doi:10.1016/j.concog.2005.09.010 
Rajaram, S., & Roediger, H. I. (1997). Remembering and knowing as states of 
consciousness during retrieval. In J. D. Cohen & J. W. Schooler (Eds.), 
Scientific approaches to the question of consciousness (pp. 213–240). 
Mahway, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.  
Rajaram, S., Hamilton, M., & Bolton, A. (2002). Distinguishing states of awareness 
from confidence during retrieval: evidence from amnesia. Cognitive, Affective 




Repacholi, B. M., & Gopnik, A. (1997). Early reasoning about desires: evidence from 
14- and 18-month-olds. Developmental Psychology, 33(1), 12–21. doi: 
10.1037//0012-1649.33.1.12 
Riggins, T., Rollins, L., & Graham, M. (2013). Electrophysiological investigation of 
source memory in early childhood. Developmental Neuropsychology, 38(3), 
180-196. doi:10.1080/87565641.2012.762001 
Ritter, K. (1978). The development of knowledge of an external retrieval cue strategy. 
Child Development, 49(4), 1227–1230. doi: 10.2307/1128766 
Roderer, T., & Roebers, C. M. (2010). Explicit and implicit confidence judgments 
and developmental differences in metamemory: an eye-tracking approach. 
Metacognition and Learning, 5(3), 229–250. doi:10.1007/s11409-010-9059-z 
Roebers, C. M. (2002). Confidence judgments in children’s and adult's event recall 
and suggestibility. Developmental Psychology, 38(6), 1052–1067. 
doi:10.1037//0012-1649.38.6.1052 
Roebers, C. M., von der Linden, N., Schneider, W., & Howie, P. (2007). Children’s 
metamemorial judgments in an event recall task. Journal of Experimental 
Child Psychology, 97(2), 117–37. doi:10.1016/j.jecp.2006.12.006 
Rollins, L., & Riggins, T. (2013). Developmental changes in memory encoding: 
Insights from event-related potentials. Developmental Science, 16(4), 599-
609. doi:10.1111/desc.12072 
Rouder, J. N., Speckman, P. L., Sun, D., Morey, R. D., & Iverson, G. (2009). 
Bayesian t tests for accepting and rejecting the null hypothesis. Psychonomic 




Rossion, B., & Pourtois, G. (2004). Revisiting Snodgrass and Vanderwart’s object 
pictorial set: The role of surface detail in basic-level object recognition. 
Perception, 33(2), 217–236. doi:10.1068/p5117 
Rugg, M. D., & Curran, T. (2007). Event-related potentials and recognition memory. 
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 11(6), 251–7. doi:10.1016/j.tics.2007.04.004 
Rugg, M. D., Mark, R. E., Walla, P., Schloerscheidt, A. M., Birch, C. S., & Allan, K. 
(1998). Dissociation of the neural correlates of implicit and explicit memory. 
Nature, 392, 595–598. 
Rugg, M. D., Schloerscheidt, A. M., Doyle, M. C., & Cox, C. J., & Patching G. R. 
(1996). Event-related potentials and the recollection of associative 
information. Cognitive Brain Research, 4(4), 297-304.doi: 10.1016/S0926-
6410(96)00067-5 
Salatas, H., & Flavell, J. (1976). Behavioral and metamnemonic indicators of 
strategic behaviors under “remember” instructions in first grade. Child 
Development, 47(1), 81–89. doi: 10.2307/1128285 
Schacter, D. L., Addis, D. R., & Buckner, R. L. (2007). Remembering the past to 
imagine the future: The prospective brain. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 8(9), 
657–61. doi:10.1038/nrn2213 
Schneider, W. (1986). The role of conceptual knowledge and metamemory in the 
development of organizational processes in memory. Journal of Experimental 




Schneider, W., & Körkel, J. (1989). The knowledge base and text recall: Evidence 
from a short-term longitudinal study. Contemporary Educational Psychology, 
14(4), 382–393. doi:10.1016/0361-476X(89)90023-4 
Schneider, W., & Pressley, M. (1997). Metamemory. In W. Schneider and M. 
Pressley (Eds.) Memory development between two and twenty (2nd ed.; pp. 
129-230). Mahwah, N. J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.  
Schneider, W., & Sodian, B. (1988). Metamemory-memory behavior relationships in 
young children: Evidence from a memory-for-location task. Journal of 
Experimental Child Psychology, 45(2), 209–233. doi:10.1016/0022-
0965(88)90030-6 
Schneider, W., Visé, M., Lockl, K., & Nelson, T. (2000). Developmental trends in 
children’s memory monitoring: Evidence from a judgment-of-learning task. 
Cognitive Development, 15, 115–134. doi: 10.1016/S0885-2014(00)00024-1 
Shanton, K., & Goldman, A. (2010). Simulation theory. Wiley Interdisciplinary 
Reviews: Cognitive Science, 1(4),527-538. doi:10.1002/wcs.33 
Shin, H., Bjorklund, D. F., & Beck, E. F. (2007). The adaptive nature of children’s 
overestimation in a strategic memory task. Cognitive Development, 22(2), 
197–212. doi:10.1016/j.cogdev.2006.10.001 
Shing, Y. L., Werkle-Bergner, M., Li, S.-C., & Lindenberger, U. (2009). Committing 
memory errors with high confidence: Older adults do but children don’t. 




Simons, J. S., & Spiers, H. J. (2003). Prefrontal and medial temporal lobe interactions 
in long-term memory. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 4(8), 637–48. 
doi:10.1038/nrn1178 
Sluzenski, J., Newcombe, N. S., & Kovacs, S. L. (2006). Binding, relational memory, 
and recall of naturalistic events: a developmental perspective. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology. Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 32(1), 89–100. 
doi:10.1037/0278-7393.32.1.89 
Smith, M. E. (1993). Neurophysiological manifestations of recollective experience 
during recognition memory judgments. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 
5(1), 1–13. doi:10.1162/jocn.1993.5.1.1 
Son, L., & Metcalfe, J. (2000). Metacognitive and control strategies in study-time 
allocation. Journal of Experimental Psychology. Learning, Memory, and 
Cognition, 26(1), 204–221. doi:10.1037//0278-7393 
Spaniol, J., Davidson, P. S. R., Kim, A. S. N., Han, H., Moscovitch, M., & Grady, C. 
L. (2009). Event-related fMRI studies of episodic encoding and retrieval: 
meta-analyses using activation likelihood estimation. Neuropsychologia, 47(8-
9), 1765–79. doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2009.02.028 
Sprondel, V., Kipp, K. H., & Mecklinger, A. (2011). Developmental changes in item 
and source memory: Evidence from an ERP recognition memory study with 





Sprondel, V., Kipp, K. H., & Mecklinger, A. (2012). Electrophysiological evidence 
for late maturation of strategic episodic retrieval processes. Developmental 
Science, 15(3), 330–44. doi:10.1111/j.1467-7687.2011.01130.x 
Swick, D., Senkfor, A. J., & Van Petten, C. (2006). Source memory retrieval is 
affected by aging and prefrontal lesions: Behavioral and ERP evidence. Brain 
Research, 1107(1), 161–76. doi:10.1016/j.brainres.2006.06.013 
Trott, C. T., Friedman, D., Ritter, W., & Fabiani, M. (1997). Item and source 
memory: Differential age effects revealed by event-related potentials. 
Neuroreport, 8, 3373-3378. doi: 10.1097/00001756-199710200-00036 
Trott, C. T., Friedman, D., Ritter, W., Fabiani, M., & Snodgrass, J. G. (1999). 
Episodic priming and memory for temporal source: event-related potentials 
reveal age-related differences in prefrontal functioning. Psychology and 
Aging, 14(3), 390–413. doi: 10.1037/0882-7974.14.3.390 
Tulving, E. (1985). Memory and consciousness. Canadian Psychology/Psychologie 
Canadienne, 26(1), 1-12. doi: 10.1037/h0080017 
Uncapher, M., Otten, L., & Rugg, M. (2006). Episodic encoding is more than the sum 
of its parts: An fMRI investigation of multifeatural contextual encoding. 
Neuron, 52(3), 547–556. doi: 10.1016/j.neuron.2006.08.011 
Waters, H. (1982). Memory development in adolescence: Relationships between 
metamemory, strategy use, and performance. Journal of Experimental Child 
Psychology, 33, 183–195. doi: 10.1016/0022-0965(82)90014-5 
Weil, L. G., Fleming, S. M., Dumontheil, I., Kilford, E. J., Weil, R. S., Rees, G., … 




adolescence. Consciousness and Cognition, 22(1), 264–71. 
doi:10.1016/j.concog.2013.01.004 
Wellman, H. (1977a). Tip of the tongue and feeling of knowing experiences: A 
developmental study of memory monitoring. Child Development, 48(1), 13–
21. doi:10.2307/1128875 
Wellman, H. M. (1977b). Preschoolers’ understanding of memory-relevant variables. 
Child Development, 48(4), 1720–1723. doi: 10.2307/1128544 
Wellman, H. M., Cross, D., & Watson, J. (2001). Meta-analysis of theory-of-mind 
development: the truth about false belief. Child Development, 72(3), 655–84. 
doi: 10.1111/1467-8624.00304 
Wellman, H., & Johnson, C. (1979). Understanding of mental processes: A 
developmental study of “remember” and “forget.” Child Development, 50(1), 
79–88. doi:10.2307/1129044 
Wilding, E. L. (1999). Separating retrieval strategies from retrieval success: An 
event-related potential study of source memory. Neuropsychologia, 37, 441-
454. doi: 10.1016/S0028-3932(98)00100-6 
Wilding, E. L., Doyle, M. C., Rugg, M. D. (1995). Recognition memory with and 
without retrieval of context: An event-related potential study. 
Neuropsychologia, 33, 743-767. Doi: 10.1016/0028-3932(95)00017-W 
Wilding, E. L., & Rugg, M. D. (1996). An event-related potential study of recognition 





Wilding, E. L., & Rugg, M. D. (1997a). Event-related potential and the recognition 
memory exclusion task. Neuropsychologia, 35, 119-128. doi: 10.1016/S0028-
3932(96)00076-0 
Wilding, E. L., & Rugg, M. D. (1997b). An event-related potential study of 
recognition memory for words spoken aloud or heard. Neuropsychologia, 35, 
1185-1195. doi: 10.1016/S0028-3932(97)00048-1 
Woodruff, C. C., Hayama, H. R., & Rugg, M. D. (2006). Electrophysiological 
dissociation of the neural correlates of recollection and familiarity. Brain 
Research, 1100(1), 125–35. doi:10.1016/j.brainres.2006.05.019 
Woodward, A. (1998). Infants selectively encode the goal object of an actor’s reach. 
Cognition, 69(1), 1–34. doi:10.1016/S0010-0277(98)00058-4 
Woodward, A. (2009). Infants’ learning about intentional action. In A. Woodward & 
A. Needham (Eds.), Learning and the infant mind (pp. 227–248). New York: 
Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195301151.003.0009 
Yonelinas, A. P. (2002). The nature of recollection and familiarity: A review of 30 
years of research. Journal of Memory and Language, 46(3), 441–517. 
doi:10.1006/jmla.2002.2864 
Yonelinas, A.P., & Jacoby, L. L. (1995). The relation between remembering and 
knowing as bases for recognition: Effects of size congruency. Journal of 
Memory and Language, 34(5), 622-643. doi: 10.1006/jmla.1995.1028 
Yonelinas, A. P., & Jacoby, L. L. (1996). Noncriterial recollection: Familiarity as 





Yovel, G., & Paller, K. A. (2004). The neural basis of the butcher-on-the-bus 
phenomenon: when a face seems familiar but is not remembered. 
NeuroImage, 21(2), 789–800. doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2003.09.034 
Yussen, S., & Berman, L. (1981). Memory predictions for recall and recognition in 
first-, third-, and fifth-grade children. Developmental Psychology, 17(2), 224–
229. doi: 10.1037//0012-1649.17.2.224 
Yussen, S., & Bird, J. (1979). The development of metacognitive awareness in 
memory, communication, and attention. Journal of Experimental Child 
Psychology, 28(2), 300–313. doi: 10.1016/0022-0965(79)90091-2 
